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1.1 La Industria del Transporte Aéreo
1.1.1 Desarrollo histórico
El transporte aéreo dentro de la división clásica de los modos de transporte, es relativamente
joven ya que cuenta con algo más de 100 años de antigüedad. Aunque el primer vuelo histórico
data de 1783, efectuado en París por Pilâtre de Rozier y el Marqués de d´Arlandes en un globo
de aire caliente de los hermanos Montgoler, hasta el siglo XX no se comenzó a dominar el arte
del vuelo, que posibilitó el nacimiento de la aviación comercial.
En 1884 Charles Renard y Arthur Krebs, del cuerpo de ingenieros del ejército francés
demostraron, con un dirigible propulsado por un motor eléctrico, la factibilidad del vuelo con-
trolado. Veinticinco años más tarde el conde Zeppelin creaba la primera compañía de transporte
aéreo (Delag), empleando dirigibles que llevaron popularmente el nombre de su inventor.
El periodo pionero, hasta el nal de la I Guerra Mundial, se caracteriza por la búsqueda de
seguridad y alcance sucientes para la explotación comercial del avión. El periodo entreguerras
aumenta la velocidad y tamaño, así como las plantas de potencia. Esto culmina en la postguerra
con aviones presurizados, capaces de volar a mayores altitudes, añadiendo comodidad a los
pasajeros y seguridad en vuelo.
La aparición del reactor en los años 40 y su aumento de productividad, seguida de los aviones
de fuselaje ancho y gran capacidad a partir de 1970, mejoran notablemente la economía de la
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operación y permiten el acceso al transporte aéreo de una gran parte de la población mundial.
El periodo actual se caracteriza por la madurez económica, con el trasporte aéreo convertido
en una mercancía de consumo masivo, y el esfuerzo tecnológico enfocado hacia la máxima
economía de la operación y el aumento del alcance máximo de las aeronaves comerciales.
1.1.2 Benecios económicos y sociales
La importancia socioeconómica del transporte aéreo ha sido considerada como estratégica para
el desarrollo de la economía y la evolución de las sociedades avanzadas. Por ello ha sido uno de los
sectores más regulados del campo de los servicios, tanto en su vertiente técnica (certicaciones de
material, licencias al personal, certicados de operación), como económica (derechos de tráco,
jación de tarifas, limitaciones de acceso al mercado).
Asimismo su carácter internacional lleva a que la gran mayoría de la regulación requiera de
consenso internacional. Debido a esto la máxima autoridad en este sector, la OACI, Organización
de Aviación Civil Internacional, es un organismo dependiente de las Naciones Unidas.
Este papel estratégico se puede corroborar con correlaciones a nivel mundial entre la coyun-
tura económica y las oscilaciones experimentadas por el transporte aéreo, medidas en PIB
(producto interior bruto) y en PKT (pasajero por kilómetro transportado) respectivamente, o
también en renta per cápita y viajes aéreos por persona y año (fuentes IATA).
De acuerdo con los estudios llevados a cabo en 2004 y actualizados en 2008 por el Oxford
Economics dentro de ATAG (Air Transport Action Group, coalición independiente de organi-
zaciones de transporte aéreo cuya misión es promover el crecimiento sostenible de la aviación
en benecio de la sociedad global, con más de 70 miembros), los efectos del transporte aéreo
los podemos dividir en:
-Directos: derivados de aerolíneas, aeropuertos, mantenimiento de aviones, control de tráco
aéreo, actividades de servicios a pasajeros (handling, gestión de equipajes, tiendas y catering).
- Indirectos: en una segunda derivada incluyen a suministradores de combustible, construc-
tores de aeronaves y aeropuertos, suministradores de piezas y subcomponentes de aeronaves,
suministradores y fabricantes de bienes a tiendas de aeropuertos y actividades de servicios
(centros de llamadas, tecnologías de la información, contabilidad).
- Inducidos: que incluyen a industrias de apoyo al transporte aéreo como tiendas, productores
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de bienes e industrias de servicios (bancos, restaurantes).
- Catalíticos: de la contribución económica como facilitador del crecimiento de otras indus-
trias en el sentido de (1) promoción del comercio mundial, (2) del turismo y (3) mejora de
la productividad, vía innovación e inversión, eciencia de las operaciones y mercado laboral
atrayendo personal altamente cualicado.
En cuanto a hechos y cifras de la industria del transporte aéreo y sus efectos, podemos
resumirlo en lo siguiente (fuente ATAG abril 2008):
- Más de 2.000 aerolíneas alrededor del mundo operan una ota total de 23.000 aeronaves.
Sirven a más de 3.750 aeropuertos a través de una red de varios millones de km gestionados por
más de 160 proveedores de servicios de navegación aérea.
-Transporta 2,2 miles de millones de pasajeros y 44 millones de toneladas de carga aérea
anualmente. El 40% del comercio interregional es transportado por aire, que signica unos 3,5
billones de $, lo que representa un 35% del comercio internacional.
Tiene un impacto económico global estimado de 3,650 miles de millones de $, equivalente al
7,5% del PIB mundial: 408 miles de millones de $ en efecto directo, 465 miles de millones de $
en indirectos, 220 miles de millones de $ en inducidos, y el resto, 1800 miles de millones de $,
en catalíticos.
-Genera un total de 32 millones de empleos (a nivel mundial, entre directos (5,5 millones
/ 408 miles de millones del PIB: 4.7 de la industria de aerolíneas y aeropuertos y 780.000 del
sector aeroespacial civil), indirectos (6,3 millones / 465 miles de millones PIB, en la compra
de bienes y servicios de la cadena de suministro), inducidos (2,9 millones) y de su impacto
catalítico en el turismo y otros (17,1 millones).
- El 40% del turismo internacional viaja por aire, representando dicha industria un empleo
directo a nivel mundial de 79 millones de personas, representando el 3,4% del PIB mundial.
En cuanto a la parte social, el transporte aéreo:
-A diferencia de otros modos, paga los costes de su propia infraestructura (pistas de ater-
rizaje, terminales de aeropuerto, control de tráco aéreo), a través de las tasas.
- Contribuye al desarrollo sostenible, facilitando el comercio y el turismo, generando desarrol-
lo económico, creando empleo, mejorando el nivel de vida, aliviando la pobreza, incrementando
los ingresos públicos vía tasas, y reforzando la conservación de áreas protegidas.
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- Facilita el transporte a áreas remotas y promueve la inclusión social conectando dichas
comunidades con el resto de su país.
- Las redes de transporte aéreo facilitan la entrega de ayuda humanitaria y de emergencias
en cualquier lugar de la tierra; también aseguran el suministro de aparatos médicos y órganos
para trasplantes.
- Mejora la calidad de vida facilitando las experiencias de ocio y culturales a través de las
fronteras. Permite destinos de vacaciones y visitas a amigos y familiares, lo cual no sería posible
por la distancia mediante otros modos de transporte.
- Las aeronaves son hoy un 70% más ecientes en consumo de combustible y 20 decibelios
(75%) menos ruidosos, que hace 40 años, consumiendo 3,5 litros de queroseno por pasajero
cada 100 km (mucho menos que los coches familiares).
1.1.3 Regulación en el transporte aéreo
En cuanto al marco institucional del transporte aéreo internacional en el que se ampara su
regulación podemos hablar de tres acuerdos y Convenios.
- Convenio de Varsovia.
Firmado por 31 países en 1929, tenía como objetivo regular de manera uniforme las condi-
ciones del transporte aéreo internacional en lo referente a los documentos empleados para tal
transporte y a la responsabilidad del transportista.
Lo más importante era la responsabilidad del transportista, según 4 principios: siempre un
contrato internacional (título de transporte), el transportista siempre responsable (responsabil-
idad objetiva), indemnizaciones máximas por pasajero y por kg de carga o equipaje, los cuales
podían superarse si se probaba la existencia de una emisión incorrecta del billete.
- Convenio de Chicago.
Tras la 2a Guerra Mundial para establecer un régimen para la aviación civil internacional,
se reunieron 52 Estados en 1944 en la Conferencia de Chicago, en la que se adoptaron una serie
de 4 Apéndices, cuyos temas principales a efectos regulatorios son los siguientes:
- Reconocimiento de la soberanía exclusiva y absoluta de cada Estado sobre la zona aérea
que abarca su territorio, incluidas las aguas territoriales adyacentes.
- Establecimiento de qué servicio aéreo internacional regular requiere el permiso especial u
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otra autorización del Estado y se realizará bajo las condiciones de dicho permiso o autorización.
En cambio, no exige esas condiciones para el tráco no regular, que podrá realizarse sin per-
miso previo, aunque cada Estado tiene libertad de imponer las reglamentaciones, condiciones o
restricciones que estime convenientes.
- La reserva el tráco de cabotaje (transporte entre dos aeropuertos del mismo Estados) a
los nacionales de cada Estado.
-Establecimiento de la nacionalidad de las aeronaves, que será única, estará vinculada a su
matrícula y deberá exteriorizarse mediante las correspondientes marcas.
- Cada Estado será responsable de las normas de aeronavegabilidad correspondientes a sus
propias compañías (sin perjuicio del asesoramiento técnico de OACI).
- Creación de OACI (Organización de la Aviación Civil Internacional).
- Acuerdo relativo al Tránsito de los Servicios Aéreos Internacionales con facultades para
los Estados contratantes.
- Denición de las libertades del aire, que han servido siempre de referencia en toda clase
de negociaciones entre países.
- Convenios internacionales bilaterales (ASAs, Acuerdos sobre Servicios Aéreos).
El Sistema de Convenios es el tradicional de Derecho Internacional. Representantes de los
países afectados rman un texto que deberá, posteriormente, ser conrmado mediante depósito
del consiguiente instrumento de raticación, no entrando en vigor hasta que este último haya
sido raticado por un número predeterminado de Estados.
Los convenios multilaterales y bilaterales son formas complementarias de regular en el trans-
porte aéreo. El Convenio de Chicago o el de Varsovia son los ejemplos clásicos de este tipo de
acuerdo.
El mecanismo normal de un convenio bilateral es el siguiente:
- Los contratantes son dos Estados (a través de sus Ministerios de Asuntos Exteriores)
- Hacen referencia al Convenio de Chicago.
- Designan una o varias compañías aéreas para explotar los derechos de tráco del acuerdo.
- Determina qué rutas, escalas y derechos de tráco se conceden mutuamente.
- Delegan en las compañías aéreas designadas las discusiones de tarifas, muchas veces jadas
por IATA (International Air Transport Association) o los Estados, de frecuencias y capacidad
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en las rutas determinadas previamente.
Según la Organización Mundial del Comercio (WTO, 2006), los siete indicadores relevantes
para la apertura al servicio aéreo programado son los siguientes: (1) Garantía de los derechos
/ libertades del aire (2) Claúsula de capacidad: regulación de volumen de tráco, frecuencia
y/o tipo de avión (3) Aprobación de tarifas (4) Retención: condiciones de operación para un
transportista extranjero como propietario (5) Designación del no de aerolíneas que pueden servir
el mercado de rutas entre los 2 países (6) Intercambio de estadísticas de operación (7) Acuerdos
cooperativos de Marketing entre las dos aerolíneas.
La mayoría de los ASAs se regulan normalmente en precio, capacidad y acuerdos coopera-
tivos, siendo el 60% de designación múltiple (Fu, Oum y Zhang, 2010).
1.2 Procesos de Liberalización del Transporte Aéreo
1.2.1 Proceso de la Desregulación en EE.UU.
En lo referente al transporte aéreo el 24 octubre de 1978, el Congreso de EEUU aprobaba la
Ley Pública 95-504, titulada Airline Deregulation Act 1978, con el n de eliminar una gran
parte del control de la Administración sobre los aspectos comerciales del transporte aéreo, e
incentivar la competencia entre las compañías aéreas, en benecio del usuario.
Anteriormente a esta ley, existían dos organismos con competencias en esta área:
- FAA (Federal Aviation Agency), que se ocupaba de las normas de aeronavegabilidad,
seguridad, certicación, control de espacio aéreo y demás problemas técnicos de la Aviación
Civil.
- El CAB (Civil Aeronautics Board) que controlaba rutas, frecuencias, tarifas y el resto de
los aspectos comerciales. La Deregulation Actpreveía su eliminación, a través de un proceso
gradual en el que en 1982 desaparecería su control sobre rutas y frecuencias, en 1983 el control
de tarifas, en 1984 se iniciaría el cierre paulatino de sus instalaciones, para dejar de existir en
1985.
Las competencias del FAA han quedado como estaban y los servicios estadísticos y buro-
cráticos del CAB pasaron a otros centros del Departamento de Transportes (DOT).
El sistema de control implantado por el CAB, en vigor con pequeñas modicaciones desde
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1938, exigía permiso administrativo para que una compañía iniciará las operaciones en una ruta,
para que aumentara la oferta en no de frecuencias o en cantidad de asientos, y para introducir
una nueva tarifa. Tradicionalmente el CAB sólo autorizaba aumentos de oferta si el factor de
ocupación en la ruta subía por efecto de la demanda y no daba permiso a nuevas compañías
a menos que las existentes no fuesen capaces de aumentar su oferta. A estos efectos el CAB
gozaba de inmunidad frente a la ley antimonopolio norteamericana.
Para la jación de los niveles tarifarios, todas las compañías aéreas norteamericanas tenían
obligación de comunicar trimestralmente al CAB una relación pormenorizada de gastos, de
modo que esta Agencia pudiese calcular las tarifas a aplicar en base a los costes medios en
cada ruta, un 55% de factor de ocupación y una rentabilidad objetivo del 12% que, con las
comisiones ocultas y otras prácticas no declaradas, se reducía a menos de la mitad. Con todo
esto los benecios de las compañías dependían sobre todo de su eciencia relativa. De esta
forma, se creaba un entorno muy regulado y poco competitivo, en el que era muy difícil entrar
para las nuevas empresas, y al mismo tiempo era difícil perder dinero.
Los resultados dieren en muchos aspectos del imaginado por Alfred Kahn, economista de
Harvard y padre de la Deregulation Act. Según su proyecto, las nuevas compañías acabarían
haciendo desaparecer a las poderosas Aerolíneas de bandera, porque estas tenían estructuras
empresariales burocratizadas, incapaces de hacer frente a la competencia de los recién llega-
dos que disfrutarían de costes mucho menores al tener todo el personal de nuevo ingreso. Sin
embargo, las compañías establecidas reaccionaron ideando formas imaginativas de hacer valer
su mayor tamaño y su mayor implantación en el mercado. Así, durante los primeros años 80
desarrollaron diversos sistemas de marketing que les dieron una considerable ventaja sobre sus
nuevos competidores, y que hoy están prácticamente incorporados por casi todas las grandes
compañías mundiales. Entre esos elementos destacan los siguientes:
-Red de rutas hub & spoke: al instaurarse la libertad de acceso al mercado nacional en
Estados Unidos, las compañías se encontraron de pronto con la posibilidad de penetrar en
más mercados de los que sus recursos físicos les permitían. Algunas compañías se lanzaron a
una expansión acelerada que les condujo a la quiebra en la recesión de los primeros años 80.
Otras modicaron su red de rutas para cubrir con su ota el mayor no de puntos posibles,
mediante el hub & spoke. Con este dispositivo como ejemplo, podían reunirse 7 puntos entre
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sí, reemplazando 21 vuelos directos por 6 indirectos, aunque requieran estos últimos un cambio
de avión. Las ventajas de esto eran notables: se sirven más rutas punto a punto con el mismo
no de vuelos, los vuelos que sirven un hub agrupan trácos de diversos destinos y pueden
utilizarse aviones mayores, de menor coste unitario, el factor de ocupación aumenta y es menos
sensible a la estacionalidad, al acumularse trácos diferentes. Como inconvenientes pueden
citarse la disminución del no de enlaces directos, requerir la disposición de capacidad suciente
en los aeropuertos hub, reducción de la utilización de los aviones, al aumentar los tiempos de
escala en el hub y el tiempo de los aviones fuera de base.
-Sistemas de reserva por ordenador (CRS, computer reservation systems): la creación de una
gran red informática, que permita a las Agencias de viaje manejar en tiempo real un sistema
tarifario crecientemente complejo desde la libertad de jación de precios, requiere una gran
inversión que las pequeñas compañías no podían permitirse. La tendencia general ha sido la
concentración.
- Programa de Fidelización: conocidos como viajero frecuente en los que se premia con
viajes gratis a los clientes eles de una misma compañía aérea, fueron iniciados por American
Airlines, bajo el nombre de AmericaAdvantage. El propio sistema de hub & spoke, facilita
múltiples posibilidades de volar entre dos puntos a través de distintas escalas intermedias,
por lo que la oferta de recompensas solo alcanzables por acumulación de viajes en la misma
empresa se convierte en un poderoso instrumento de marketing. Su diseño original se basaba
en una contabilidad de millas voladas, con las que se obtenían billetes gratis o promociones a
clases superiores dentro del avión. Con el tiempo, estos programas están evolucionando hacia un
sistema de puntos, que pueden ganarse también en hoteles, alquileres de coches u otros servicios
conexos.
1.2.2 Proceso de la Desregulación en la UE
Una vez denidos los objetivos de integración del trasporte aéreo en el Mercado Único Europeo
y los instrumentos legales para alcanzarlos (Directivas y Reglamentos), se decidió que el paso
al nuevo régimen legal se haría por fases, agrupando las medidas en lo que se ha dado en llamar
paqueteslegislativos:
-Primer paquete (dic. 1987), y en él se abrían posibilidades de incrementar unilateralmente
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la oferta entre dos países de la CEE, dentro de ciertos límites, y aplicar descuentos también
limitados por unas bandas tarifarias predeterminadas.
-Segundo Paquete (jun. 1990): permitiendo el tráco de 5a libertad dentro de la CEE (vuelos
entre dos países de la CEE efectuados por aeronaves de un 3o), introduciendo el concepto de
doble desaprobación de tarifas (una compañía podrá proponer tarifas para vuelos entre dos
países de la CEE, que sólo serían suspendidas si los dos países afectados las desaprobaban).
-Tercer Paquete (jul.1992), con las condiciones denitivas del Mercado único, en vigor el 12
de enero de 1993.
El contenido de este Tercer paquete legislativo produce una completa liberalización del
mercado intracomunitario, manteniendo algunas excepciones temporales que desaparecieron,
prácticamente en abril de 1997. En su contenido destaca lo siguiente:
- Concesión de licencias: los requisitos permiten obtener licencias de explotación a empresas
controladas por ciudadanos comunitarios, en el país de la CE donde tengan su base prin-
cipal, cumpliendo normas comunes mínimas, tanto técnicas (Air Operator Certicate) como
nancieras. Desaparece, por tanto, la condición de que las compañías aéreas de un país de la
UE tengan que ser mayoritariamente propiedad de ciudadanos de ese país.
- Acceso al mercado: libertad total para la compañías comunitarias, salvo restricciones hasta
abril de 1997 para las rutas domésticas, y permanentes en Servicio Público, Congestión, Rutas
Regionales y Medioambiente:
- La limitación que desaparece en abril de 1997 prohibía a las compañías comunitarias hacer
vuelos interiores en otros países de la Unión, a menos que esta etapa fuera continuación de un
vuelo internacional y que en ese trayecto no se ofreciese a la venta más del 50% de la capacidad
del avión.
- En rutas regionales, la UE limitó durante 2 años la competencia en una nueva ruta servida
por aviones de menos de 80 plazas, a este tamaño de aviones, como protección a las compañías
de pequeño tamaño. Igualmente, un Estado miembro puede limitar a un operador una ruta si
la declara de Interés Público, pero tienen la obligación de sacar a concurso su concesión entre
todas las compañías de la UE.
- Las limitaciones por Congestión (bien sean por falta de Servicios de Control adecuados
o existencia de menos slots aeroportuarios de las que solicita la demanda) deben ser jados
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públicamente por cada Estado en condiciones equitativas.
- Tarifas: libertad total para compañías comunitarias, controlada por la Comisión, que ac-
tuará a petición de parte en los casos de precios abusivos o venta por debajo de costes,.
A estas condiciones especícas del transporte aéreo habría que añadir los efectos de la
aplicación de las reglas generales de competencia en la CE, como acuerdos restrictivos, posición
dominante, concentraciones y ayudas públicas.
1.2.3 Efectos económicos de la Desregulación
Pese a tener una serie de objetivos comunes, entre los que se cuentan incentivar la competencia
y reducir los precios del transporte aéreo, los procesos liberalizadores norteamericano y europeo
dieren en un aspecto esencial: el nivel de intervención de las Administraciones Públicas. Mien-
tras que en EEUU el propósito declarado es reducir al máximo, la participación administrativa
en el funcionamiento del sector, con independencia de su evolución, la UE no pretende reducir
las normas existentes sino cambiarlas para aumentar el nivel de competencia entre las empresas
transportistas, en benecio del consumidor. En ambos casos, los poderes públicos disponen de
elementos legales de intervención para prevenir la competencia desleal o el abuso de posición
dominante, pero su aplicación es mucho más frecuente en UE que en EEUU.
Un segundo factor diferencial es la política exterior, con EEUU intentando exportar su
losofía de cielos abiertos para los vuelos internacionales excluyendo, eso sí, el acceso a su
mercado interior (cerca del 30% de todos los PKTs -pasajeros por kilómetro transportados-
mundiales), que queda reservado a sus propias compañías. La política de la UE no está, por
el momento tan claramente denida puesto que, a la disparidad de opiniones entre sus Esta-
dos miembros, se une el problema de la falta de reconocimiento mundial a considerar vuelos
interiores los vuelos internacionales entre países de la UE.
Fu, Oum y Zhang (2010) han investigado el crecimiento de tráco y económico sustancial
que ha conllevado la liberalización del transporte aéreo, concluyendo los siguientes efectos de
dicha desregulación:
- El aumento de competencia, que reduce precios y estimula el crecimiento de tráco por: (1)
ganancias de eciencia productiva por la optimización de las redes de vuelos de las aerolíneas
y sus estrategias de precios, debido a la presión competitiva para la supervivencia; (2) exter-
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nalidades positivas generadas para la economía global (empleo, turismo, comercio y transporte
logístico).
- La liberalización permite a las aerolíneas optimizar su red de vuelos para cubrir los merca-
dos intra e intercontinentales, mediante: (1) la red de vuelos hub & spokeconsigue ganancias
en ingresos y/o costes de producción; (2) la consolidación del mercado vía fusiones y adquisi-
ciones se podrá llevar a cabo si la propiedad extranjera y el control de restricciones se relaja
en cuanto a normativa, lo cual reforazará la posición competitiva de las redes de vuelos de las
aerolíneas; (3) las alianzas estratégicas, que permiten a las aerolíneas obtener su segunda mejor
conexión a vuelos intercontinentales donde los Acuerdos Bilaterales Internacionales (ASA) son
más restrictivos.
- El rápido crecimiento de las aerolíneas de bajo coste (LCC, low cost carriers) ha traído
un impacto signicativo en la industria aérea. Existe una correlación LCC- liberalización /
desregulación porque el incremento de competencia conlleva una reducción de tarifas, y por
tanto se estimula el tráco. Además las LCCs se han beneciado más por la creación de bases
en países extranjeros en la UE, si bien todavía hay restricciones a las LCC como por ejemplo
en Asia.
1.2.4 Obligaciones de Servicio Público EAS /PSO
Las obligaciones de servicio público en el transporte aéreo sirven de excepción conrmatoria
de la regla en los procesos liberalizadores de EE.UU y de la UE. En ambos, dichos servicios
(Programas de Servicios Aéreos Esenciales EAS-, y Obligaciones de Servicio Público PSO-)
eran previos y se les ha dado continuidad por su alcance (las pequeñas comunidades) y por
sus objetivos (asegurar que las pequeñas comunidades no salieran perjudicadas con los procesos
desreguladores, continuando con la contribución de las rutas aéreas para el desarrollo económico
de este tipo de regiones).
Aunque los procesos son similares en cuanto a su licitación, sus características en determi-
nadas variables hacen que dieran en eciencia (Williams and Pagliari, 2004):
-En el proceso de Obligación de Servicio Público en la UE se publica ocialmente la licitación
para una determinada ruta o grupo de rutas consideradas previamente como elegibles por la
UE a propuesta de Estado miembro. En dichas rutas se estipula un mínimo de nivel de servicio
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(frecuencias y asientos) y las tarifas máximas. En primer lugar el licitador invita a las aerolíneas
a prestar el servicio sin subvención, y si ninguna se presta a ello, se lleva a cabo una segunda
vuelta en la que se invita a las aerolíneas a pujar con lo que pedirían de subvención. El licitador
toma la decisión de la adjudicación en base a (1) cantidad de subvención solicitada por la
aerolínea, (2) nivel de servicio ofrecido, y (3) otras consideraciones relevantes. La administración
de la Obligación del Servicio Público puede ser por el Gobierno Central (ejemplo de Irlanda,
Portugal, Noruega y Suecia) o por una Autoridad Regional (caso de Francia, Alemania, Italia
y España). Una vez asignada la obligación, la aerolínea ganadora mantiene el monopolio por
tres años.
-En cuanto al proceso de licitación del Programa de Servicios Aéreos Esenciales (EAS) de
EEUU, el Departamento de Transportes (DOT) determina la elegibilidad de la ruta o rutas, así
como el nivel de servicio. Si una aerolínea no puede prestar el servicio sin incurrir en pérdidas,
el programa provee la compensación de las rutas (aproximadamente un retorno de la inversión
del 5% sobre los costes operativos más el coste de oportunidad de no operar en otra ruta más
rentable). Los criterios de elección se basan en (1) factor coste presentado, (2) abilidad de la
aerolínea y (3) acuerdos de marketing con grandes hubs, código compartido o de interlinea
con aerolíneas. Una vez concedido el programa, se permite la competencia, de tal manera que
si otra aerolínea ofrece gratis el servicio, el DOT se lo notica al incumbente para dejar de
pagarle. La subvención del servicio se hace a nivel federal.
Aunque existe cierto paralelismo entre ambos procesos, el programa EAS presenta claras
diferencias favorables en su gestión que deberían ser cuanto menos analizadas por la UE para
introducir mejoras legislativas en las PSO (Reynolds- Feighan, 1995b):
-En cuanto a la administración de este tipo de servicios, la gestión a nivel Federal del
programa EAS vs el nivel Estado miembro de las PSO asegura que la elegibilidad del servicio
va más allá de los Estados, con el objetivo de no desfavorer a los Estados menos desarrollados.
Una administración única desde la UE en las PSO reduciría las inconsistencias y desequilibrios
entre los Estados, y también la presión de los lobbies. Asimismo la subvención a nivel Federal
presenta ventajas de transparencia frente a la Estatal de la UE. Se podría plantear pagos
parciales de la Comunidad Local y/o Estado, pero siempre prevaleciendo una administración
del dinero a mayor nivel administrativo. Esto ayudaría a evitar subsidios cruzados a aerolíneas
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bandera. También debería plantearse cierta regulación en la mejora respecto de los servicios
mínimos establecidos en el servicio de PSO.
- En lo que respecta a la competencia, el monopolio de tres años a la aerolínea adjudicataria
del servicio PSO frente a la libre entrada del programa EAS, perjudica al bienestar social.
Además los costes hundidos (sunk cost) y las economías de escala en el monopolio que se
generan a lo largo de los tres años del PSO, suponen una barrera de entrada para nuevas
aerolíneas para pujar por el servicio.
1.3 Panorama actual y futuro
1.3.1 Aerolíneas de Bandera
Para el desarrollo de la red de vuelos (Fu, Oum y Zhang, 2010) en el caso de que los mercados
domésticos e internacional estuvieran ambos desregulados, las aerolíneas de red se expandirían
vía red de vuelos multihub hacia los mercados globales. Esto supondría fusiones y adquisi-
ciones intercontinentales, ya que estas son más baratas que expandir la red (Oum, Taylor y
Zhang, 1993). Las negociaciones EEUU-UE en materia de desregulación van en el sentido de
la propiedad extranjera de aerolíneas, lo cual desmantelaría completamente los Acuerdos Bilat-
erales Internacionales (ASA).
Bajo la liberalización gradual el escenario será que las aerolíneas se verán forzadas a reestruc-
turar sus redes de vuelo en estos sentidos:
- Las aerolíneas tradicionales se consolidarán bajo fusiones y adquisiciones en mercados
domésticos e intra continentales para reforzar posiciones en su continente.
- Los mercados intercontinentales se reforzarán vía alianzas estratégicas (Oum, Park y Zang,
2000). Las redes intercontinentales se verán fuertemente inuenciadas por las estructuras de
redes domésticas y continentales. Estudios previos sugieren que las alianzas intercontinentales




El efecto desregulatorio ha sido menor sobre las compañías regionales, cuya estructura estaba ya
concebida en términos adecuados a un entorno comercial poco regulado en cuanto a exibilidad
de tarifas y mercados, y enlaces punto a punto. Como nuevos problemas se presentan los altos
costes nancieros y la dicultad para conseguir slots (derechos de aterrizaje y despegue
en determinados horarios) en algunos aeropuertos, así como la necesidad de integrarse en los
CRS para asegurarse más puntos de venta. Por otra parte el abandono de las rutas menos
densas por parte de las compañías nacionales ha favorecido el crecimiento en tamaño de las
regionales y su progresiva concentración. Otras características que han desarrollado han sido la
asociación con las grandes compañías para hacer funciones de aporte y dispersión en aeropuertos
importantes a la vez que guran en sus Sistemas de Reservas. También en aviación regional se
ha aumentado progresivamente del tamaño medio del avión, que desde las 20 plazas de antes
de la desregulación, ha pasado por las 33 y 50 hasta el rango de las 70 plazas actuales.
1.3.3 Aerolíneas de Bajo Coste
La desregulación EEUU de 1978 supusó la desaparición de las aerolíneas más débiles por ban-
carrota y fusiones, a la vez que aparecieron y progresaron aerolíneas de bajo coste en el mercado
doméstico, siendo Southwest el caso de éxito más signicativo por su expansión y la continuidad
de sus bajas tarifas.
La liberalización en UE y los grados de libertad del aire del 5o al 9o han sido más aprovecha-
dos por las compañías de bajo coste al poder abrir bases fuera de sus estados de origen (Do-
bruszkes, 2009).
A la vez aparece una competencia entre aerolíneas de bajo coste y aerolíneas de bandera a
nivel doméstico. Hay tres vías de la competencia doméstica que afectan al rendimiento interna-
cional (Clougherty y Zang, 2009):
- Suponiendo que hay los mismos competidores doméstico-internacionales, si se introdujera
más competencia doméstica, se incrementaría la competencia internacional.
-La unión de economías de producción deriva en el tamaño del incumbente que opera en el
doméstico, lo cual afecta al rendimiento internacional en la industria aérea.
-La rivalidad doméstica también presiona a la calidad y productividad, aumentando a su
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vez la competencia en el internacional.
La regulación todavía pone barreras a las aerolíneas de bajo coste, sobre todo en Asia, p.ej.
Air Asia tiene que entrar en otros mercados regionales vía joint ventures.
1.4 Posicionamiento Estratégico en Aerolíneas y Motivación de
la Tesis
La descripción detallada de los principales acontecimientos y características del sector de trans-
porte aéreo de pasajeros es fundamental. La valoración adecuada del entorno competitivo ayuda
indudablemente a la gerencia en la toma de decisiones correctas para los tres tipos de aerolíneas.
Merece la pena resaltar que las aerolíneas compiten tanto en la dimensión precio como en vari-
ables de dimensión distinta al precio. Conjuntamente denen su posicionamiento estratégico.
Dichas variables se contemplan a lo largo de los distintos capítulos, tal y como sigue:
-El cambio de estructura accionarial de la privatización de aerolíneas bandera (antes propiedad
de los Estados), así como el nuevo modelo de aerolíneas de bajo coste, y las aerolíneas regionales
ya nacidas en estructura de propiedad privada, saca a la luz un nuevo sistema de incentivos para
los administradores gestión de la aerolínea: compartir la propiedad ( estos aspectos motivan el
análisis del capítulo uno).
-La operación de la red de vuelos de hub & spokede las aerolíneas bandera y las regionales,
frente al punto a punto-operación directa- de las de bajo coste, también permite una estrategia
diferenciadora de jación de precios. Este tipo de operación, debe ser tenido en cuenta por el
regulador para las Obligaciones de Servicio Público con el n de maximizar el bienestar social
( este punto motiva el análisis del capítulo dos).
-La calidad de servicio ha tomado mayor peso como estrategia de diferenciación entre las
aerolíneas de bandera y las de bajo coste, en todos sus atributos incluida la delización a través
de su sistema de gestión en programas, lo que inuye en la recompra de billetes y, por tanto,
en los resultados empresariales (esta observación motiva el análisis del capítulo tres) .
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1.5 Objetivos de la Tesis
La presente tesis doctoral tiene objetivo el estudio de estrategias y variables de aplicación en
el transporte aéreo para propietarios, gerentes y reguladores. El hilo conductor de los distintos
capítulos se fundamenta en lo siguiente.
La relativa juventud de la industria del transporte aéreo (poco más de 100 años), unido
a los elevados estándares de calidad y seguridad de sus operaciones, hace que sea un sector
altamente regulado tanto en la parte técnica como en la legislativa. Es por ello que el proceso
de liberalización se está acometiendo desigualmente en el tiempo y en el espacio (EEUU a partir
de 1978, UE a partir de 1993), si bien sirve como proceso de aprendizaje de aciertos y errores,
y como base de acometidas desreguladoras futuras del sector.
El impacto más inmediato y objetivo de las medidas de liberalización es la generación de
competencia, con lo que las aerolíneas de bandera, regionales y chárter previas a la desregulación
se han adaptado o han desaparecido ante este nuevo escenario. Sus estrategias para mantener la
ventaja competitiva sostenible en el largo plazo, sobre todo ante la aparición de las aerolíneas
de bajo coste con estrategias basadas en bajos precios, es objetivo dinámico prioritario en la
agenda de propietarios y gerentes de las aerolíneas de cualquier modelo de negocio. Asimismo
los reguladores tienen que hacer especial hincapié en los aspectos donde la regulación debe
mantenerse.
En base a lo anterior, la presente tesis tiene tres líneas de estudio que afectan a propietarios,
gerentes y reguladores de aerolíneas de bajo coste, regionales y de bandera. En concreto en un
primer término se estudiará cómo los sistemas de incentivos de reparto de la propiedad que
propone el propietario al gerente afectan a la competencia. Posteriormente, se lleva a cabo
un análisis de las variables que inuyen en la Regulación de Obligación de Servicio Público
con el n de que el Regulador actúe adecuadamente en escenarios que se le pueden plantear.
Para cada una de las partes de la tesis se plantea un caso práctico con el n de contrastar las
hipótesis planteadas (aerolíneas de EE.UU y la UE), ejemplos para modelos de gestión (estudio
de mercado de pasajeros europeos) y análisis real de mercados (OSP de Canarias). Por último,
se investigará cómo los gerentes pueden optimizar la estrategia de diferenciación vía calidad de
servicio y sus correspondientes atributos en cuanto a la asignación de recursos.
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1.5.1 Resumen de los Capítulos
En el primer capítulo se analiza, tanto desde un punto de vista teórico como aplicado, la efec-
tividad en términos estratégicos de un sistema de incentivos basado en compartir la propiedad.
Aunque hay varios sistemas de incentivos que ya se han analizado, es novedoso analizar uno basa-
do en compartir la propiedad. El modelo básico supone una estructura de gerente-propietario en
el que se plantea un juego en tres etapas: en la primera el propietario regala de manera altruista
parte de la propiedad en forma de acciones al gerente; en la segunda etapa el gerente elige el
esfuerzo a realizar, y en la tercera se compite en el mercado con estructuras de monopolio y
duopolio, en la que se estudian los incentivos estratégicos. Las predicciones del modelo teórico
se contrastan para una base de datos construida para aerolíneas europeas y norteamericanas,
divididas por tipo de aerolíneas en función del modelo de negocio (de bandera, de bajo coste
y regional). Dicha base de datos contiene variables de benecios, ingresos y pasajeros de las
compañías aéreas a lo largo del periodo 2000-2008, distinguiendo por aerolínea el grado de pro-
fundidad del sistema de incentivos de compartir la propiedad vía acciones (desde el consejo de
administración, pasando por ejecutivos hasta legar a los empleados).
En el segundo capítulo se desarrolla un análisis formal de la Regulación del transporte
aéreo. En el transporte aéreo de pasajeros, existe un número de rutas reguladas bajo normativa
de Obligación de Servicio Público (Programas de Servicios Aéreos Esenciales EAS- en EE.UU,
y Obligaciones de Servicio Público PSO- en Europa). Estas sirven de excepción conrmatoria
de la regla en los procesos liberalizadores de EE.UU y de la UE. Se trata de rutas cuyas
frecuencias y tarifas (entre otras variables) son jadas por las autoridades en un esfuerzo por
garantizar una cierta calidad en el servicio de transporte aéreo. Este capítulo indaga en los
efectos de tal regulación para evaluar (i) si hay provisión de frecuencias por encima o por
debajo del óptimo social, (ii) si la presencia de competidores afecta a los resultados, y (iii) si
hay una estructura de red de vuelos preferida entre la conexión completa o directa y la conexión
en estrella o indirecta. Se observará que el tipo de red y la estructura de mercado juegan un
papel determinante en el análisis.
En el tercer capítulo podemos ver cómo el incremento de la competencia en el sector
del transporte aéreo, sobre todo con la aparición de las aerolíneas de bajo coste, convierte la
diferenciación por Calidad de Servicio en una de las posibles estrategias de las compañías de
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bandera. Se estudia para ello el caso de un modelo para la toma de decisiones estratégicas de
los gerentes de aerolíneas sobre la calidad de servicio. Dicho modelo consiste en un sistema de
información sobre la satisfacción e importancia que los atributos de calidad de servicio tienen
para los pasajeros, y cómo esto impacta en sus intenciones de comportamiento en cuanto a
recomendación y recompra.
La metodología utiliza el instrumental propio de la teoría de juegos y que es la base de la
investigación en el campo de la organización industrial. Además de una revisión bibliográca
para cada capítulo, se realiza la modelización teórica. Con ella se obtienen resultados formales
que se puedan exponer en proposiciones y teoremas. En dos de los capítulos también se utilizan
técnicas cuantitativas de estimación, y en el otro capítulo se exponen los datos de un caso real
que permiten contrastar los resultados e hipótesis planteadas.
1.6 Conclusiones
Los resultados de los artículos son relevantes en diversos aspectos. De ellos se desprenden
implicaciones para la gerencia de indudable utilidad. La utilización de incentivos basados en
compartir la propiedad tiene efectos estratégicos y sobre la intensidad de la competencia. Por
otro lado, el establecimiento de los elementos prioritarios en la calidad de servicio permite una
gestión más adecuada de una aerolínea al poder medir sus efectos sobre la probabilidad de
recompra de billetes. Finalmente, un análisis de mercados regulados con varias variables resulta
particularmente útil para la toma de decisiones del regulador.
Conclusiones del Capítulo 1.
En cuanto a la primera hipótesis, la que indica que el sistema de incentivos de reparto de la
propiedad es fuente de ventaja competitiva, incrementando los benecios de la empresa, queda
contrastada de manera signicativa en la base de datos para aerolíneas "major 2regionales.
Con más detalle podemos decir que las aerolíneas "major.obtienen un 24% más de ingresos por
pasajero si reparten acciones hasta el nivel de los ejecutivos o hasta el de los empleados que si sólo
reparten acciones al Consejo. De la misma manera las aerolíneas regionales obtienen un 39% más
de ingresos por pasajero si reparten acciones a los ejecutivos y un 15,7% más si lo hacen hasta
el nivel de empleado que si sólo reparten a los miembros del Consejo. Los incrementos obtenidos
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en las aerolíneas de bajo coste son positivos pero no signicativos., es signicativo repartírselas
a los empleados frente al consejo en cuanto a que se obtienen más benecios. Respecto a la
segunda hipótesis, la que indica que es sistema de incentivos es más efectivo cuando menos
diferenciado es el producto, no se llega a ninguna conclusión pues no se han obtenido datos
que permitan determinar que tipo de aerolínea ofrece servicios más homogéneos, si que se ha
obtenido el resultado que indica que para un mismo nivel de reparto de las acciones tipo de
incentivo,las aerolíneas "major"siempre ontienen mas ingresos por pasajero que los otros tipos
de aerolíneas.
Conclusiones del Capítulo 2.
En cuanto a la provisión de frecuencias, para una línea aérea monopolística, se demuestra que
el equilibrio de mercado produce en general un defecto de provisión de frecuencias en relación
con el óptimo social, independientemente del tipo de red - ya sea una red de conexión completa
o una red en estrella. Así surge la necesidad de regular las frecuencias cuando la disposición a
pagar por el transporte no es lo sucientemente grande ya que el equilibrio del mercado ofrece
frecuencias demasiado bajas.
Mirando a la preferencia por una estructura de red, la de estrella alcanza mayores benecios
y bienestar social en comparación con la estructura de red directa cuando la disposición a pagar
por el transporte no es lo sucientemente grande, y cuando la desutilidad de los pasajeros de
vuelos indirectos es lo sucientemente baja. Los límites de estos parámetros no son los mismos
en la comparación de los benecios y del bienestar social, dando lugar a un conicto entre los
incentivos privados y sociales. El análisis identica los potenciales fallos de mercado asociados
a la arquitectura de la red.
Para el análisis de competencia, en un duopolio y suponiendo una red completamente conec-
tada, se demuestra que el equilibrio de mercado produce un exceso de frecuencias no óptimo en
los servicios de transporte: las dos compañías establecen mayores frecuencias en relación con el
óptimo social. En un duopolio mixto, si el operador público es relativamente más eciente que
el operador maximizador de benecios, entonces se reduce la distorsión en las frecuencias; el
operador que maximiza los benecios ja muchas frecuencias, pero el operador público establece
muy pocas en comparación con el óptimo social. El mismo tipo de divergencia se mantiene cuan-
do el operador público es relativamente más ineciente, y sin embargo la distorsión es mayor.
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Esto sugiere que tener una aerolínea pública que compite en el mercado es una forma alternativa
de controlar las frecuencias totales previstas, a la regulación directa de dichas frecuencias.
Conclusiones del Capítulo 3.
Los resultados sobre las hipótesis planteadas muestran que la importancia relativa y el nivel
de satisfacción de los atributos prioriza aquellos atributos sobre los que tomar decisiones. En
el caso de la muestra, los cinco de los doce atributos más importantes (puntualidad, tarifas,
horarios/frecuencias, atención personal a bordo y comodidad en cabina) tienen diferentes niveles
de satisfacción, siendo la puntualidad, tarifas y comodidad en cabina el enfoque que se debería
dar a las acciones de inversión / asignación de recursos por tener menor nivel de satisfacción
y, por tanto, mayor potencial de mejora. En una segunda derivada, el análisis de regresión
probit muestra que cuatro de los doce atributos son signicativos a la hora de aumentar la
probabilidad de recompra y / o recomendación con aumentos en sus niveles de satisfacción. Otros
dos atributos son signicativos en aumentos exclusivos de la probabilidad de recomendación.
Los atributos signicativos en recompra y recomendación son puntualidad, tarifas, comodidad
en cabina y comidas/bebidas, siendo la comodidad en cabina la de mayor impacto, seguido
de comidas / bebidas, tarifas y puntualidad en cuanto a recompra y al revés respecto a la
recomendación. La tipología del pasajero en cuanto a motivo del viaje (negocio, ocio, visita a
familiares-otros) no es signicativa en lo referente a que el pasajero business no determina mayor
o menor probabilidad de recompra y /o recomendación que el resto. Pero sí que el pasajero de
negocios añade dos atributos signicativos en aumento de la probabilidad de recomendación:
embarque e idiomas.
Por tanto el modelo planteado y apoyado por un caso de estudio se revela como un sistema
de información simple y de ayuda en la toma de decisiones estratégicas en cuanto a Calidad












The neoclassical view of the rm considers it as a black-box with the objective of prot maximiz-
ation. There are certainly other goals, both economic (market share, revenue growth, customer
satisfaction, etc) and non-economic (product quality and services, social responsibility, etc) and
rms decide optimally to get closest to their goals. The objectives themselves and how they are
achieved become particularly relevant in modern economies where the separation of ownership
and control is a central feature. Normally, the managersobjectives di¤er from those of the
shareholders. Thus, in the context of a principal-agent model, many would argue that the as-
sumption of prot maximization is wrong. Still, endogenously treating the incentive structure
within the rm has shown that managers may be motivated to pursue objectives that improve
the ownersprot in an oligopoly game. Firms now try and design incentive schemes that allow
them to retain talent in their e¤orts to maintain competitive advantage and better compete in
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the global market. This chapter is a contribution to the literature on delegation games and looks
into the strategic e¤ects of a prot-sharing incentive scheme, both theoretically and empirically.
The use of incentive schemes1, whether based on absolute or relative performance, is wide-
spread. The number and type of compensation practices is varied and although they may
respond to di¤erent problems within the rm, they are certainly designed to achive overall rm
competitiveness. Amongst them, compensation contracts based on prot-sharing systems are
our focus of analysis here. Such systems are employed in many industries like automobiles,
mutual funds, newspapers, construction, distribution, and so on. In particular, they are used
in the airline industry. This chapter studies prot-sharing schemes in imperfectly competitive
markets; the model proposed delivers some testable hypotheses that are empirically examined
for a sample of airline companies.
The hierarchical view of the rm and the role of strategic delegation have been extensively
examined in the literature2. In an oligopoly framework it has been shown that players can gain
strategic advantage by using agents who play the game on their behalf and this can be a part
of an equilibrium behaviour. Representative papers include Vickers (1985), Sklivas (1987) and
Fershtman and Judd (1987), where the nal stage is in quantities. The vertically separated
rm, if the rival is integrated, achieves the outcome of a Stackelberg leader when the choice
variables are strategic substitutes. So the literature suggests that rms should always delegate
for strategic reasons. In particular, their simpler formulation exhibits the property that the
equilibrium under delegation appears more competitive than the standard Cournot model.3
What these contributions o¤er is a game-theoretic explanation for managers nonprot-
1Prendergast (1999) provides an overview on the provision of incentives in rms.
2The e¤ects of the hierarchical structure of rms have been studied in the context of international oligopol-
ies (Brander and Spencer (1988), Das, 1997, Moner-Colonques, 1997), as well as in dividing production into
competing divisions and franchises (Baye et al. 1998, Moner-Colonques et al. 1998, González-Maestre, 2000,
Rysman, 2001), regarding the exit of rivals in models of nancial contracting (Bolton and Scharfstein, 1990) or
rm performance in models of investment decisions (DeMarzo and Fishman, 2007), and regarding the choice of
distribution channels for di¤erent products (Moner-Colonques et al. 2004), to mention a few.
3 In fact, the strategic advantage of delegation remains when the nal stage variables are strategic complements,
as in McGuire and Staelin (1983) and Bonnano and Vickers (1988). However, in contrast with Cournot, delegation
is both in the individual and collective interest of upstream rms.
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maximizing behaviour. This conclusion can be stated alternatively as follows: a certain degree
of managerial nonprot-maximizing behaviour serves the ownersprot-maximizing objectives,
which is somehow a paradoxical result. In the aforementioned papers, VFJS for short, managers
receive a compensation/bonus that is proportional to a linear combination of prots and sales
revenue. Other papers have focused on relative performance incentives. Thus, Salas (1992)
extends this literature so that a managers objective function is a function of own and rivals
prots. He noted that the use of relative performance incentives produces a conict between
risk sharing and the strategic e¤ects of delegation. Compensation contracts based on relative
performance evaluation are examined by Aggarwal and Samwick (1999). Their model predicts
that rms will place greater weight on rivalsperformance relative to own rm performance the
higher the degree of competition in the industry.
More recently, Jansen et al. (2007) propose a delegation model based on prots and market
shares. These authors assume that each managers remuneration in a duopoly is a weighted sum
of prots and market share; they show that the equilibrium in a market share delegation game
leads to higher duopoly prots than in a sales delegation game. Interestingly, they examine
duopoly games where each manager is o¤ered a di¤erent contract. In fact, they show that, if
owners decide whether to delegate or not and, if so, how to design the contract for the manager,
the dominant strategy for the owners is to hire a manager with a bonus contract that includes
prots and market share components. The strategic consequences of other managerial incent-
ives in oligopoly are studied in a richer setting by Jansen et al. (2009). They distinguish four
bonus systems: pure prots evaluation, sales evaluation, market share evaluation, and relative
prots evaluation. Jansen et al. (2009) show that the dominant strategy for an owner is to
design a contract with a bonus based on relative prots evaluation.
These theoretical ndings have relevant implications regarding the evaluation of managers
performance in strategic settings, indeed providing testable implications when accounting for
the nature of competition. - whether di¤erentiated Bertrand or Cournot. Thus Aggarwal and
Samwick (1999) predict that, under di¤erentiated Bertrand competition, the optimal contract
compensates the manager positively on both own and rival-rm performance; it compensates
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negatively on rival-rm performance under di¤erentiated Cournot competition. Their empir-
ical ndings, for a sample of executive compensations in US rms 1995, are consistent with
the Bertrand specication and so conrm that the use of relative performance schemes has the
e¤ect of softening competition.4 The recent paper by Anderson et al. (2010) draws attention
to the fact that, despite the improvement in rm performance following the implementation of
bonus plans, a complete analysis must consider their impacts on goals. With detailed data on a
US specialty retailer, these authors nd that the introduction of bonus plans with participative
goal setting is accompanied by lower goals that are more accurate predictors of subsequent
sales performance. In fact, di¤erences among managers (like career horizon and local store
knowledge) explain diminished sales and sales goal growth relative to the industry following the
introduction of the bonus plan.
Finally, experimental investigations on the issue of strategic delegation have also been
provided. Thus, Huck et al. (2004) design an experiment to test the predictions of the VFJS
model: subjects do not choose the contract with a sales bonus. Nevertheless, such behaviour
is rational given that managers do not play according to the subgame perfect equilibrium pre-
diction when asymmetric contracts are given. More recently, Georgantzís et al. (2008) test
the predictions of relative performance compensation schemes. In particular, they report ex-
perimental evidence that conrms the received prediction of owners preference for relative
performance incentives over prot-revenue contracts.
Our contribution is twofold. First, we add to this literature by considering a further in-
centive scheme. The prots sharing compensation system consists of owners remunerating their
managers with shares; the manager thus becomes a proprietor whose work is rewarded accord-
ing to an absolute performance measure. In addition, the model assumes that the managers
e¤ort, which is costly, translates into greater demand. It is shown that the use of the prot
4Although basically focused on the study of internal labour markets, it is worth alluding to the extensive
empirical literature devoted to analyze how human capital theories can explain compensation and careers in
organizations. Ortín-Angel and Salas (1998) explore the determinants of bonus payments among a large sample
of top and middle managers from Spanish rms. Their analysis considers whether rms employ a bonus and,
if so, decide on the size of the bonus. Interestingly, they nd a trade-o¤ between the use of bonus-based and
promotion-based incentives; bonuses play more of a role in slow-growing industries where promotion opportunities
and rewards are lower.
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sharing incentive system results in greater output, e¤ort, owner prot and managers utility
relative to the case of no use. In fact, these statements hold true in a duopolistic environment,
where the rival owner-manager pair does not employ such incentive scheme thus conrming
their strategic role. Besides, the percentage of shares assigned to managers is higher in more
competitive environments.
These theoretical ndings call for empirical analysis, which is our second contribution. We
build a data set that distinguishes the depth in the use of this compensation system for a
number of airline companies during 2000-2008. The estimation considers major, low-cost and
regional airlines, and three levels of use in the prot-sharing scheme - shares given just to the
board of directors, also to executives, and also to any members in the rm. It is found that
low-cost and regional airlines that employ the incentive system further down in the hirerachy
do perform better. Furthermore, it is shown that mean prots for low-cost and regional airlines
are higher than for major airlines, where competition is weaker.
The next section briey presents the case of an airline company, Vueling, that has made use
of the prot sharing incentive scheme. Section 2.3 develops the model and assumptions; the
analysis distinguishes the monopoly and the duopoly case. The results obtained deliver some
testable hypotheses. The empirical analysis is given in Section 2.4. Some concluding remarks
close the chapter.
2.2 The case of Vueling
The attraction and preservation of talent in the rm is nowadays a source of sustainable com-
petitive advantage. That is why the choice of incentive schemes becomes a crucial issue. Besides
such schemes must take into account the endogenous (like the life cycle) as well as the exogenous
(like macroeconomic variables) characteristics surrounding the rm.
The case study we briey present, the low-cost airline Spanish Vueling, comprises the period
since its birth until the year after it went public following a time of exponential growth. The
passenger air tra¢ c sector was witnessing, at that time, months of strong competition and
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growth with the emergence of low-cost carriers. In addition, this type of airlines has meant
an element of product di¤erentiation in the industry for this segment has been the one with a
greater growth rate.
The technical complexity in this sector requires specialized workforce and both the regula-
tion and the intensity of capital invested increases entry and exit market barriers. In the given
period of analysis, Vueling was compelled to e¤orts above those signed in otherwise incom-
plete contracts. Such e¤orts can only be implemented if there is a strong underlying personal
commitment. An e¤ective incentive scheme is necessary to push human capital to perform well
above the average. The type of incentives employed by Vueling was the "prot-sharing system",
by which the rm owners give shares altruistically to the board of managers thus linking them
contractually to the future of the rm, and also in an emotional way because of the feeling of
property derived from such compensation scheme. It implies a long term commitment which
makes it di¤erent from other commonly studied short term schemes, such as those based on an-
nual prots and/or sales revenues. It is the emotional component that supports the extra e¤ort
specied in contracts and limited by Labour Law in both remuneration and working hours.
In the light of the aforementioned complex environment intrinsic to the passenger air tra¢ c
sector, and the important intensity of competition in the development of low-cost carriers, the
data contained in Table 2.1 below reveal Vuelings high growth rates and suggest the strong
human capital e¤ort made to attain such gures.
May 2004 May 2006 May 2007
Sta¤ 90 630 1100
Fleet (Airbus A320) 2 14 21
Routes 4 35 57
Daily Flights 16 98 150
Passengers 0 > 4 million > 9 million
Table 2.1: Vueling Growth 2004-07
Vueling constitutes a real life example that calls for a formal model to study incentive
28
schemes based on sharing the property of the rm and to further test some hypotheses with
data from US and European airlines.
2.3 The model
The model considers the rm as a vertical structure à la VFJS, so that it consists of an owner-
manager structure. The prot level enjoyed by the rm depends on the e¤ort level exerted
by the manager, taking into account that e¤ort is costly.5 As shall be made clear below, the
managerial compensation system is one based on a prot-sharing scheme, which is in contrast
with the various bonus compensation systems assumed in previous research based on VFJS.
The prot-sharing system is captured by , the percentage of shares given to the manager, for
0   < 1. The allocation of the percentage of shares is made by the owner and is prior to
the managers choices of e¤ort and output levels (the market competition variables). Thus,
the owner might decide not to give any shares to his manager,  = 0, which would reduce the
analysis to a pure prot scheme. But the owner can certainly not give away all shares,  = 1,
since he would no longer be the owner.6
We follow the standard treatment in the literature in that service is an element of vertical
di¤erentiation. The (indirect) utility obtained by a consumer is greater when the service is
incorporated into the product (higher quality) than when it is not (lower quality). Such service
is related to the managers e¤ort, e. This can be represented by an inverse demand p(q; e), with
@p=@e > 0. This implies that the market-clearing price will depend on how much is produced
and also on the level of e¤ort exerted by the manager. The provision of e¤ort is costly and it is
assumed to be equal to e2=2; with  a positive constant. That is, it indicates that raising the
e¤ort level raises costs and does so at an ever-increasing rate - it exhibits diminishing returns.
The inverse demand for the product is given by p = a+ e  q, which collects that a positive
choice of e¤ort level, e, induces a parallel outward shift in demand since the maximum price
that consumers are willing to pay will be higher. The price of the product is denoted by p,
5This analysis is fairly standard in the IO literature (see e.g. Church and Ware 2000, and Pepall, Richards
and Norman, 2011).
6 It is not our purpose to discuss on how decisions are taken inside the rm when an important percentage
of shares is not in the hands of the owner. Rather, we are interested in assessing whether a choice of some 
improves rms prot when such compensation system is employed.
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whereas q stands for output level; a is the maximum willingness to pay absent any e¤ort.
To keep things simple we assume that the managers labour, L, is the only input necessary
for production, and that one unit of labour transforms into one unit of output. Hence, if w is
the wage (per unit of labour), we have that the managers salary is wL, which is equal to wq,
the cost of labour to the rm. It is assumed that a > w: When choosing output, the manager
is told to maximize prots, that is,
 = (p  w)q (2.1)
The manager, when choosing e¤ort, maximizes his utility function as given by,




so that he receives, in addition to his salary (wq), some remuneration under a prot sharing
system () noting that e¤ort is costly ( e2=2). Altogether we have that a positive e¤ort level
e has both a positive e¤ect (on demand) and a negative e¤ect (on cost).
The owner will consequently earn O, a proportion of total prot according to the percentage
of shares that he keeps, that is,
O = (1  )(p  w)q (2.3)
To see the e¤ect of a prot sharing system we proceed to solve two multi-stage games (of
complete information). In the rst of the games, the owner does not employ the incentive
system. Specically, the manager chooses his e¤ort level in the rst stage of the game, whereas
in the second, and knowing the e¤ort level, chooses an output level. In the second game, we
consider a stage prior to the two already described, where the owner decides on the participation
in prot that incentives the managers behaviour. Comparing the results of these two games
will allow us to establish the possible e¤ectiveness and goodness of the remuneration system
proposed. The analysis will distinguish the monopoly and the duopoly cases to see the e¤ect
of market structure in the design of incentives, and both e¤ort and output choices.
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2.3.1 Monopoly
We begin our analysis with one rm consisting of an owner-manager pair, and start presenting
the game with prot sharing compensation.
As usual, the game is solved in the usual backward way. In the third stage of the game, for
given  and e, the manager chooses the prot maximizing output level, that is,
max
q
 = (p  w)q (2.4)
Taking the derivative of  with respect to q and setting it equal to zero yields the (subgame
perfect) equilibrium output, q = (a + e   w)=2: It is straightforward to check that the second
order condition (s.o.c.) for a maximum holds.
We now move to the second stage of the game. Plugging q above in (2.2), the managers












(a+ e  w)2 + 2w(a+ e  w)  e2
2
Solving @V=@e = 0 for e gives
e =
a+ (1  )w
2    (2.6)
where the s.o.c. for a maximum holds. It can be seen that e¤ort is positively related with
market size, a;the wage, w; and also to prot participation, : In the rst stage the owner
chooses the percentage of shares that maximizes prot and is given to the manager to enhance
his e¤ort. Therefore, the owner solves,
max

O = (1  )(p  w)q = (2.7)
=
(1  )(2(a  w) + w)2
4(  2)2
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Solving @O=@ = 0 gives the next equilibrium expression for prot participation
s = 2(1  ) (2.8)
Superscript s is used to denote the equilibrium when the prot-sharing scheme is employed.
The fulllment of the s.o.c. for a maximum imposes that  > 1=2: This condition, and together
with the fact that the prot participation cannot exceed unity, implies that the parameter 
must belong to the interval (1=2; 1): We may then write down the equilibrium output, e¤ort
and owners prot as follows:
qs = 2a+w(1 2)8 4 e
s = 2a(1 )+w(2 1)4 2 (2.9)
s =
[2a + w(1  2)]2
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   16 (2.10)
and the equilibrium utility for the manager is given by
V S =
4(a  w)(a(1  ) + w) + w2
16   8 (2.11)
Let us now solve the model in a setting where the owner does not employ any incentive
system prior to e¤ort choice and product market competition. Making  zero in the above
analysis leads us to
e = w2 q




 = w(4a+w(1 4))8 (2.12)
where superscript  is used to denote the equilibrium variables when the prot-sharing
scheme is not employed. To study the e¤ects of the prot sharing incentive system we can
compare the equilibrium e¤ort levels, with and without it, that is:
es   e = (1  )[2a + w(1  2)]
(2   1)2 ; (2.13)
which leads us to conclude that the prot sharing mechanism induces a greater e¤ort level
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as long as  2 (1=2; 1).
Regarding prots we can take the di¤erence and obtain:
s    = [2a + w(1  2)]
2




(1  )2(2a + w(1  2))2
162(2   1) ; (2.14)
so that prot is higher when (2   1) > 0 i.e. for  > 1=2:
As for the managers utility we have that:
V s   V  = (1  )[2a+ w(1  2)]
2
8(2   1) (2.15)
which is positive since  2 (1=2; 1):We can then state the following result.
Proposition 1 Under monopoly, there is a parameter range for the cost of e¤ort, ; such that:
i) a prot sharing system induces more e¤ort by the manager than without the system;
ii) a prot sharing system generates a higher prot level for the owner than without it and,
iii) a prot sharing system generates a higher utility level for the manager than without the
system.
To see the consistency of our results, i.e. that 0   < 1, recall that it must be the case that
 2 (1=2; 1). Regarding positive e¤ort in equilibrium, we must have that a=w > (1 2)=(1 );
since a > w we get the same condition on . Finally, equilibrium output will be positive as
long as 2(a   w) + w, which holds since a > w. The intuition for the result goes as follows.
Note that the provision of e¤ort is worthy to the manager - prot and quantity increase with
e - but costly (see equation (2.5)). Without the incentives, the equilibrium price p is equal to
[2a(2 1)+w(1+2)]=4; whereas the equilibrium price ps under the prot-sharing incentive
becomes [2a+ 3w(2   1)]=[4(2   1)]: The provision of e¤ort shifts out demand: the shift is
greater with the incentive since es > e: So although output increases (qs > q); it is also the
case that price is higher, that is, ps > p: The use of the incentive scheme induces more e¤ort
in such a way that the total prot to be shared is now higher and so both the owner and the
manager are better o¤.
The e¤ect of competition is studied in the next subsection.
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2.3.2 Cournot duopoly
We now assume that there are two owner-manager pairs; only one of the pairs is allowed to
employ the prot sharing system.
The basic assumptions of the monopoly model are maintained. The extension to duopoly
will allow us to identify whether there exists a unilateral incentive to employ a prot sharing
system that makes that owner-manager pair gain a strategic advantage in the product market.
We assume that there is Cournot competition and that products are imperfect substitutes. In
particular, the system of inverse demand functions is given by7:
p1 = a+ e1   q1   dq2 p2 = a+ e2   dq1   q2 (2.16)
where parameter d belonging to (0; 1) represents the degree of product di¤erentiation; as d
approaches 1 products become homogeneous and they are independent when d equals zero.
The game with prot sharing compensation. Let us then characterize the subgame perfect
equilibrium when, say rm 1, employs the prot sharing system whereas rm 2 does not.
Superscripts sn denote this situation. As usual, we solve the game backwards. In the third
stage, the managers compete in quantities to solve:
max
q1
sn1 = (p1   w)q1 maxq2 
sn
2 = (p2   w)q2 (2.17)
Setting @sn1 =@q1 and @
sn
2 =@q2 equal to zero and solving for q1 and q2 yields:
q1 =
(a  w)(2  d) + 2e1   de2
4  d2 (2.18)
q2 =
(a  w)(2  d) + 2e2   de1
4  d2 (2.19)
We now move up to the second stage of the game where the managers simultaneously choose
their e¤ort levels. Noting that the manager of rm 1 is incentivized with a percentage of shares,
we may write
7The utility function U is assumed to be separable, linear in the numeraire commodity and quadratic and
strictly concave in the di¤erentiated good: U = y + (a + e1)q1 + (a + e2)q2   (1=2)(q21 + q22 + 2dq1q2), where













2(2  d)w(2 + d  2) + 4(a(2  d) + 2e1   de2)  (4  d2)e1
(4  d2)2 (2.21)
and the s.o.c. for a maximum implies that @
2V1
@e21
< 0; that is, (4  d2)2   8 > 0: Similarly, for





4  d2   e2 (2.22)
Note that the derivative of V2 with respect to e2 is not a function of e1 and so we cannot
talk about strategic substitutability or complementarity regarding the variable e¤ort in this
asymmetric setting. Solving the system of rst order conditions, @Vi=@ei = 0, i = 1; 2; yields
the following (subgame perfect) equilibrium e¤ort levels:
esn1 =
2(2  d)2(2 + d)[2a  w(2(  1)  d)w]  8dw




Plugging (2.23) and (2.24) into the equilibrium quantities (2.18)-(2.19) allows us to write
the objective function of the owner as a function of the parameters and . We can therefore
write down the problem for owner of rm 1 as:
max

O1 = (1  )(p1   w)q1 = (2.25)
=
(1  )(2  d)2[(a  w)(4  d2) + 2w]
((4  d2)  8)2





The fulllment of the s.o.c. for a maximum imposes that  must be greater than 8=(4   d2)2;
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which is indeed the same condition for equilibrium sn to be lower than 1. Besides,  must be
smaller than 16=(4   d2)2 for sn > 0:Hence, under duopoly, the parameter  must belong to
the interval ( 8
(4 d2)2 ;
16
(4 d2)2 ): Interestingly, @
sn=@d > 0; so that when competition is stronger
(d tending to one) the owner transfers a higher percentage of shares to the manager.
We can express the equilibrium quantities as
qsn1 =
(2  d)[(a  w)(4  d2) + 2w]
2((4  d2)  8) (2.27)
qsn2 =
[(a  w)(4  d2) + 2w][(2 + d)(4 + d)(2  d)2   16]
4((4  d2)  8)(4  d2) ; (2.28)
e¤ort levels as,
esn1 =
 16dw + (2  d)2(2 + d)(8a+ w(d(4 + d)  4))  (1=2)(2  d)4(2 + d)32(a  w)




(4  d2) ; (2.30)
and manager 1s utility and prots as
V sn1 =
64d2w2   4(2  d)2(2 + d)w(16da  (2  d)(4 + d(8 + d))w)
16(4  d2)2((4  d2)2   8) + (2.31)
+
4(2  d)4(2 + d)2(4a+ d(4 + d)w)2(a  w)
16(4  d2)2((4  d2)2   8)  
  (2  d)
6(2 + d)43(a  w)2
16(4  d2)2((4  d2)2   8)
O1 = (1  )sn1 =
(2  d)2[(a  w)(4  d2) + 2w]2
32((4  d2)  8) (2.32)
sn2 =
[(a  w)(4  d2) + 2w]2[(2  d)2(2 + d)(4 + d)   16]2
162(4  d2)2((4  d2)2   8)2 : (2.33)
We next apply the same logic as above to solve the game where none of the owners imple-
ments the prot sharing system. The symmetric equilibrium results are the following, where
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[(a  w)(4  d2) + 2w]2
(2  d)2(2 + d)42 (2.37)





As we did in the monopoly case, we now conduct a number of comparisons to assess the ef-




Since the degree of product di¤erentiation d ranges between 0 and 1; we have it that 8=9 <  <
16=9 when competition is maximal (d = 1). Positive equilibrium quantities require that the
numerator in qsn2 be positive; hence (2+d)(4+d)(2 d)2 16 > 0 leads to  > 16(2+d)(4+d)(2 d)2 :
This means that qsn2 = 0 as long as  2 ( 8(4 d2)2 ; 16(2+d)(4+d)(2 d)2 ) whereas the duopoly is viable




Regarding e¤ort levels, it is easily checked that esn1   esn2 > 0: Since esn2 = e1 it follows that
manager 1 makes a greater e¤ort under the prot sharing system and that e¤ort level is greater
than the rivals.
Regarding the prots of the owner, O1   sn2 > 0 and O1   1 > 0: This conrms the
unilateral incentive to employ a prot sharing system to achieve a strategic advantage. Finally,
the manager of rm 1 achieves a greater utility level when receiving a percentage of shares,




2 . Consequently, the following result can be established.




(4 d2)2 ); such that:
i) A prot sharing system induces more e¤ort by the manager than without the system. Such
e¤ort level is greater than the rivals, who is not given the incentive.
ii) A prot sharing system generates a higher prot level for the owner than without the system.
Such prot level is greater than the rivals, who does not employ the system.
iii) A prot sharing system generates a higher utility level for the manager than without the
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system, and greater than the rival manager.
Let us give some intuition about how the prot sharing incentive works. Consider the
reaction function space in the last stage of the game where quantities are chosen. Quantity qi
is a function of e¤ort ei: Equations (2.30) and (2.35) tell us that the manager who is not given
the incentives chooses the same e¤ort level regardless of whether the rival manager is given
the incentives or not. So the reaction function of the manager of rm two remains the same.
However, the manager of rm one, when given the prot sharing incentives, makes a greater
e¤ort. The "direct" e¤ect of e¤ort is to increase own demand; there are no externalities in
e¤orts. This translates into an outward shift in its output reaction function: the equilibrium
quantity of rm one is bigger and, since the variables are strategic substitutes, the equilibrium
quantity of rm two decreases. A greater output results in higher prot and, although e¤ort is
costly, the net e¤ect is that the managers utility and prots exceed those when the incentive
scheme is not employed - the division of prot, ; is chosen such that both the owner and the
manager are better o¤.
To further see the e¤ects following the introduction of competition, we next establish some
comparisons between the monopoly and the duopoly cases.
Proposition 3 For a given parameter range for the cost of e¤ort, the percentage of shares
given to the manager in a duopoly is higher than in a monopoly.
The latter result follows from taking the di¤erence sn   s = 16 (4 d2)28   2(1   ) =
d2(8 d2)
8 ; which is positive. Notice that the range of values for  in the monopoly case is
 2 (1=2; 1); whereas that range is  2 ( 16
(2+d)(4+d)(2 d)2 ;
16
(4 d2)2 ) in the duopoly case - the
interval shifts to the right when there is competition. The comparison would only be meaningful
when both intervals overlap.
From the analysis the following testable hypotheses are derived.
 H1: Firms that employ a prot-sharing incentive system perform better than those who
do not.
Hypothesis 1 is a consequence of Propositions 1 and 2 above, whereby an owner that in-
centives his manager is capable of achieving higher prots than without them and prots that
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exceed those of the rival. Therefore, if H1 were conrmed, we would say that the prot-sharing
incentive system is a source of competitive advantage.
 H2: The prot sharing incentive scheme is more e¤ective in giving a competitive advantage
the stronger the competition.
The statement of hypothesis 2 follows from Proposition 3 and also from the fact that a
greater value of d results in higher  and more e¤ort, (see equations (2.26) and (2.23)).
2.4 Empirical analysis
2.4.1 The data
We wish to provide evidence that supports the testable hypotheses derived from the theoretical
model developed. To this end we have constructed a database for the passenger airline sector,
the sector we have presented as the motivating example. First, we selected the sources that
contained performance indicators of US and European airlines. The sources are the US Depart-
ment of Transport and the company reports available at the airlines webpages - be them in the
stock list or not. The airline types in the database are classied according to the following:
- "Major", these are ag carriers that operate in networks with medium and long haul ights
(these are no-low-cost airlines),
- "Low Cost", airlines that y point-to-point (non-stop ights), these are low-cost carriers
operating medium and short haul ights, and
- "Regional", airlines that y point-to-point providing short haul ights, these are no-low-
cost carriers serving connections with the "Major" airlines.
The database comprises 23 airlines, 17 are North American and the remaining 6 are European.
According to the above classication there are 8 major companies, 10 low cost companies (6 of
which are in the EU) and 5 regional companies (see Table 2.2).
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Major Low Cost Regional
ALASKA, AMERICAN AIRLINES, A IRTRAN, ALLEGIANTAIR ATLANTIC SOUTHEAST ,
USA CONTINENTAL AIRLINES, DELTA AIRLINES JETBLUE, SOUTHWEST , EXPRESSJET , FRONTIER ,
HAWAIAN, .NORTHWEST , MESA , .SKYWEST
USAIRWAYS, UNITED AIRLINES
AIRBERLIN , CLICKAIR ,
EU EASYJET , FLYBE,
RYNAIR ,VUELING ,
Table 2.2 Airlines by Region of Origin and Category Type
We have taken data of some quantitative variables reecting rm performance, and collected
information about the incentive schemes based on prot sharing at di¤erent levels within the
rm. As for rm performance, the variables are total number of passengers and annual revenue
(to obtain revenue per passenger). The total number of observations for the period 2000-2008 is
168. Regarding the incentive schemes, the reports provide information about whether, during
the period of analysis, a particular airline company employed prot sharing in any form, such
as stock options, giving shares, and so on. Furthermore the reports also provide information on
how far down in the hierarchy do the schemes apply. This allows us to distinguish the following
levels of use:
- "Board", comprising the members that belong to the board of directors,
- "Executives", that embodies all the executive posts in the rm, and
- "Employees", including all members in the rm (from pilots to clerks).
Therefore, the depth in the use of prot-sharing incentive system is stronger in the category
"employees", followed by "executives" and then by "board". We can rephrase hypothesis H1
saying that rms that employ a deeper incentive system (from board to employees) perform
better. All revenues have been converted to euros and deated using the consumer price index.
Details on the database are given in the Appendix.
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2.4.2 Analysis
One of the results in the theoretical model is that a rm that employs a prot-sharing incentive
scheme performs better than a rm that does not do so. To compare revenues per passenger
across airline type and prot-sharing incentives, we use panel data techniques to estimate a
random e¤ects model using the following reduced form equation:
log(revenue/pax)it = b0 + b1 Regional+ b2 Low-cost+ b3 Executive+ b4 Regional  Executive
+b5 Low-cost  Executive+ b6 Employee+ b7 Regional  Employee
+b8 Low-cost  Employee + uit (2.38)
The dependent variable is the logarithm of revenue per passenger. Regional is a dummy
variable that takes value one if the observation corresponds to a regional airline and zero
otherwise; Low-cost is a dummy variable that takes value one if the observation corresponds to
a Low-cost airline and zero otherwise; Executive is a dummy variable that takes value one if
the observation corresponds to a company operating an executive prots sharing scheme; and
nally, Employee is a dummy variable that takes value one if the observation corresponds to
a company operating an employee prots sharing scheme. The interactive terms capture the
intersection between airline type and the incentive scheme, for instance, the variable Regional
x Executive takes value one for a regional airline operating a prot sharing scheme at the
executive level. Eventually, uit = i + "it is a compound error term where i is the individual
e¤ect considered as random e¤ects and "it is an error term with the classical properties.
By construction, b^0 is the estimated mean revenue per passenger that corresponds to the
omitted category, i.e. a major airline operating an incentive scheme at the board level. Adding
up to this baseline the estimates of the dummies that correspond to a rm of a given airline type
using a given incentive scheme, we can obtain the mean revenue per passenger corresponding
to that rm. For example, the estimated mean revenue per passenger of a low-cost rm using
an employee incentive scheme would be given by b^0 + b^2 + b^6 + b^8. Further, the estimation of
the reduced form above allows us to test statistically whether there exist di¤erences between
any pair of rms that di¤er either only in one of the characteristics analyzed (airline type and
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incentive) or in both of them.
As the dependent variable is in logs, the revenue per passenger di¤erence, computed from
the estimated coe¢ cients b^i as 100 (exp(b^i)   1), shows the average percentage di¤erence in
revenue per passenger between a major airline operating a board incentive scheme and any
di¤erent combination of airline type and incentive type. Table 2.3 below shows the results with
the transformed estimates, where the transformed values are denoted by b^i :
Table 2.3: Transformed Estimates for b^i = 100 (exp(b^i)   1)
The pairwise comparisons carried out in Table 2.4 allow testing possible di¤erences in rev-
enue per passenger for di¤erent prot sharing incentive schemes taking into consideration the
type of carrier to which the airline belongs to. To start, our estimation results for major com-
panies suggest that revenues per passenger are related to the deepness of the prot-sharing
incentive scheme: revenues per passenger are signicantly higher when major airlines run ex-
ecutive and employee schemes that when they run the board one (revenues per passenger are
about 24% higher in both cases). In the same line for regional airlines, extensions of the prot-
sharing incentive scheme from board to executive or employee also result in higher revenues per
42
passenger (39.6% and 15.7% higher for executive and employee, respectively)8. However, the
lack of signicance of the pairwise comparisons shown in the third column of Table 2.4 suggest
that for low-cost carriers the type of prot-sharing incentive scheme does not have any inuence
on mean revenues per passenger.
Table 2.4: Pairwise Comparison of the E¤ects on Revenue per Passenger
of Incentive Schemes by Airline Type
We may therefore conclude that H1 is conrmed in a signicant way in the case of major and
regional airlines: the prot-sharing incentive scheme is thus a source of competitive advantage
in the air passenger sector.
The pairwise comparisons shown in Table 2.5 suggest the relevance of type of prot sharing
incentive as a determinant of di¤erences in revenues per passenger across the three types of
carriers considered. Thus, when incentives are at the board level revenues per passenger are
about 53% lower for regional and low cost carriers than for major carriers. Analogously, when
incentives are at the employee level (the deepest level of incentives) revenues per passenger are
also lower for regional and low-cost carriers than for major airlines, and this time this di¤erence
8Furthermore for the regional airlines, pairwise comparison suggest not statistically signicant di¤erence
between the mean revenues per passenger for companies running employee and executive incentive schemes.
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is even larger (revenues per passenger are 62% and 61% lower for regional and low-cost carriers,
respectively). However, when incentives are at executive (intermediate) level the only signicant
di¤erence is between low-cost and major carriers as revenues per passenger of major companies
are 70.7% higher than those of low cost carriers.9
Table 2.5: Pairwise Comparison of the E¤ects on Revenue per Passenger
of Airline Type by Incentive Type.
2.5 Conclusions
With the modern view of the rm and the separation of ownership and management, the
literature has identied the role and e¤ects of strategic delegation. However, strong competitive
environments open the door to new incentive schemes. This chapter has studied the e¤ectiveness
and the strategic role of a prot-sharing incentive scheme. On a theoretical ground, the owner
that employs the incentive scheme achieves higher prots than without them, and such prots
exceed those of the rival rm. Besides, the percentage of shares given to the manager is higher
9Although we are able to show that, once considering a particular incentive level, mean revenues per passenger
are typically higher for major airlines. We have not enough information to determine the level of competition in
each of the di¤erent carrier types. Therefore no empirical test has been undertaken related to H2.
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when competition is stronger. At the empirical level, the chapter provides evidence conrming
the results derived from the model. The prot-sharing scheme can encompass further down
in the hierarchy. Increasing their depth can be advantageous as the empirical analysis reveals.
Using a database of North American and European airlines, estimates conrm that major and
regional airlines that employ the incentive system further down in the hierarchy do perform
better. Furthermore, it is shown that, once considering a particular incentive level, mean
revenues per passenger are typically higher for major airlines.
The chapter delivers some useful managerial implications. Firstly, the design of a compens-
ation scheme is important for rm success. Earlier work has shown that incentive payments
based on absolute and relative performance objectives give the rm a strategic advantage vis
a vis rivals. We have shown that an absolute performance evaluation scheme like giving shares
to managers is indeed a source of competitive advantage. Secondly, managers put great e¤ort
to distinguish their products from rivals. Though costly, the prot-sharing scheme encourages
such e¤ort as long as it enhances demand for the di¤erentiated product; this turns out to be a
protable instrument for the owner-manager pair. Thirdly, the participation of managers in a
rms ownership structure particularly serves a double purpose in strong competition environ-
ments; on the one hand, managers become tougher competitors in the market and, on the other,
the rm has a useful tool to retain talent. Our model has been applied to the air passenger
transport sector. There are certainly other features that can help explain the rapid growth
and success of some low-cost and regional carriers, yet we believe the prot-sharing incentive
scheme to be an important one. Future research may include the consideration of externalities
in e¤ort choices as well as establishing whether prot-sharing is strategically chosen (and is a
better one) relative to other incentive schemes.
2.6 Appendix
As indicated in the text, the data sources are the US Department of Transport as well as the
company reports available at the airlines webpages. From there information per airline about
how deep the incentive system is implemented has been obtained. The dependent variable in
the regressions is total revenue per passenger. Note however that homogeneity in the data is
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required. Thus, to control for any country of origin di¤erences we have employed the exchange
rates in the table below to have revenue data in euros.
YEAR USD GBP CHF JPY SEK DKK NOK
2000 0.924 0.609 1.558 152.33 8.446 7.454 8.114
2001 0.896 0.622 1.510 99.53 9.256 7.452 8.049
2002 0.945 0.629 1.467 108.73 9.159 7.431 7.510
2003 1.131 0.692 1.521 118.06 9.124 7.431 7.999
2004 1.243 0.679 1.544 130.96 9.125 7.440 8.372
2005 1.245 0.684 1.548 134.40 9.280 7.452 8.013
2006 1.256 0.682 1.573 136.87 9.253 7.459 8.046
2007 1.371 0.685 1.643 146.06 9.252 7.451 8.018
2008 1.471 0.797 1.587 161.24 9.617 7.456 8.225
Table 2.6: Exchange rates 2000-2008
Finally, the data have been deated with the Consumer Price Indices displayed below.
YEAR USA IRELAND UK GERMANY SPAIN
2000 3.4 5.4 0.8 2.1 4.0
2001 1.6 4.9 1.1 1.6 2.7
2002 2.4 4.6 1.2 1.2 4.0
2003 1.9 3.5 1.3 1.0 2.6
2004 3.3 2.2 1.3 2.3 3.2
2005 3.4 2.5 2.0 1.4 3.7
2006 2.5 4.0 2.3 1.4 2.7
2007 4.1 4.9 2.4 3.1 4.2
2008 0.1 4.1 3.8 1.1 1.4
2009 2.7 -4.5 2.3 0.9 0.8
Table 2.7: Consumer Price Indices 2000-2009
The following tables provide the summary statistics of revenues per passenger sorted by
airline type. For each type of incentive the statistics provided are in the following order:
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maximum value, minimum value, mean and standard deviation.
Table 2.8: Summary Statistics Major Airlines
Table 2.9: Summary Statistics Regional Airlines
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Table 2.10: Summary Statistics Low-cost Airlines
Next Table reports the b^i estimates of equation and p-values.
Table 2.11: Results of the regression
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Chapter 3
The Impact of Network Structure in
Public Service Obligations in
Passenger Air Transport
3.1 Introduction
Following the deregulation in the USA (1978) and in Europe (1997), many changes have been
observed in the airline sector. Among these, it is worth mentioning the reorganization of net-
works into hub-and-spoke structures, the formation of alliances, and the emergence of low-cost
carriers. These subjects have been studied in the literature. However, there exist regulated
routes under the norms of public service obligation services (PSO). These are routes whose
frequencies and fares are xed by authorities in an e¤ort to guarantee a certain quality in air
transport services. This chapter enquires into the e¤ects of such regulation to assess i) whether
there is an underprovision or an overprovision of frequencies relative to the social optimum,
ii) whether the results are a¤ected by the presence of competitors, and ii) whether there is a
preferred network architecture, either a fully-connected network or a star network1.
The literature has examined the e¤ects on frequencies and fares both in a fully-connected
1The reader may see Borenstein (1992) for an overview after the liberalization of the US airline industry, and
Doganis (1994) for Europe.
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network and a star network. As already mentioned, the deregulation process led to an increased
use of the hub-and-spoke (HS) networks. The comparison of networks can be cast in terms of
a cost approach and/or a demand approach. Regarding the former approach, a key feature is
the presence of the airline technology exhibiting economies of scope: if the xed cost of oper-
ating a route is rather high and there are fewer passengers, then the HS network is less costly
than a fully-connected (FC) one. Regarding the latter approach, their comparison entails the
consideration of how much passengers value a direct ight along with ight frequency. Thus a
monopoly airline will make more prot in an HS network when passengersvaluation of direct
ights is su¢ ciently low; frequencies and fares will be higher than under a fully connected net-
work. A compact self-contained comparison can be found in Shy (1995, pages 440-448), where
passengers are homogeneous in their preferences. A formal and more recent analysis can be
found in Brueckner (2004) where passengers are heterogeneous in travel benets and incur costs
of scheduling delay, and there are economies of operating larger aircraft. Brueckner (2004) es-
tablishes conditions under which either the HS or the FC network is preferred by the monopoly
airline. However, the welfare analysis shows that ight frequency, tra¢ c volumes and aircraft
size all fall below the socially optimal solution.
The analysis of airline competition has mainly been conducted in a deregulated framework,
which is a natural direction of research given the competition environment over the last decades.
In this context, network choice becomes a strategic variable for airline rms. Oum, Zhang and
Zhang (1995) rst developed a model where duopolistic carriers choose their route structures
before they compete in output levels. In a setting with cost and demand interactions, these
authors show that, typically, HS networks have strategic advantages over FC networks. En-
caoua et al. (1996) consider asymmetric carriers to analyze the strategic choice of departure
times-then-price for two airlines when one relies on connecting tra¢ c from the other in an HS
network. The results are driven by demand side arguments since passengers on a one-stop
ight between a city pair see the two legs of a journey as two complementary components of
the full trip. None of these papers investigates the welfare implications in di¤erent types of
networks. Barla and Constantatos (2005), in a setting where each airline decides on its capacity
under demand uncertainty, note the exibility-precommitment tradeo¤ between both types of
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network: both structures can be a Nash equilibrium. However, the HS network is shown to
be welfare superior in terms of both technological and allocative e¢ ciency. The recent con-
tribution by Flores-Fillol (2009) includes demand and supply network e¤ects in a two-stage
game where rst airlines choose their network conguration and then compete in frequencies
and fares. Carriers adopt an HS (resp. FC) structure when transport costs are su¢ ciently low
(resp. high); asymmetric equilibria also arise. It is found that frequencies characterizing FC
network structures are below the social optimum. Interestingly, ight frequency can become
excessive under HS network congurations and so his analysis provides an explanation to the
observed overprovision of frequencies in unregulated markets where HS networks prevailed.
Another aspect of strategic behaviour is related with an airlines response about network
structure in the face of entry. The earlier paper by DeVany (1975) studied entry in the by then
regulated air transportation industry. He drew attention to the relevance of schedule rivalry,
i.e. ight frequency, in assessing the e¤ects that changes in the various sorts of deregulation
might produce. In a setting where passengers value service quality (due to increases in ight
frequency), Oum, Zhang and Zhang (1995) have shown that hubbing is useful in deterring entry
by reducing rivals prot. Hendricks, Piccione and Tang (1997) develop a hub-and-spoke model
to show that the hub incumbent operator nds it optimal not to exit from the spoke market and
entrants (regional carriers) are forced to leave: the argument rests on the network externalities
that arise in the connecting ights between a pair of non-hub cities. Finally, Berechman et
al. (1998) assume heterogeneous passengers regarding their value of time. If alone a monopoly
airline makes more prot under an FC network, whereas it is better o¤ with an HS network
when there is entry in one of the routes; it cannot deter entry but nds it strategically prof-
itable to switch its network conguration. This chapter contributes to the literature in that a
welfare analysis is provided. Regarding the monopoly case, and because the airline can choose
whether to serve all passengers or leave the market partially covered, the market equilibrium
may provide the socially optimal frequencies - a result that contrasts with earlier ndings. Be-
sides, when the disutility incurred by passengers taking an indirect ight is su¢ ciently large
the complete network attains greater welfare; private and social interests need not be aligned
depending on the size of the disutility incurred relative to the willingness to pay for travelling.
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The empirical literature that examines the inuence of market structure on airline compet-
ition is extensive (see Brander and Zhang, 1990, Brueckner and Spiller, 1994, Marin, 1995, and
Fisher and Kamerschen, 2003, only to mention a few). Some have studied the e¤ect of com-
petition on frequencies, such as those of Pai (2010) and Wei and Hansen (2007). However, the
number of papers that look into regulatory aspects in the airline industry is scarce. Williams
(2005) notes how the di¤erent interpretation of PSO across EU countries calls for an amend-
ment of the European PSO legislation; he praises the benets of the tendering process employed
in Norway. Bitzan and Junkwood (2006) study airfares in thin US routes (fares are 11% higher
for ights serving smaller communities) whereas Santana (2009) concludes that airlines under
PSO programmes do have higher costs thereby a¤ecting their economic performance. For the
Spanish case, the recent paper by Calzada and Fageda (2011) shows that prices are higher in
routes with price discounts to residents ying elsewhere; whether discounts a¤ect frequencies is
unclear. However, regarding intra-island routes in the Canary and Balearic Islands, price caps
and frequency oors have led to lower prices and higher frequencies as compared with other
unregulated routes having similar features.
There now exist a number of papers on mixed oligopolies. These study the social desirability
of having a public rm maximizing total surplus competing against private prot-maximizing
rms. The idea is to check whether the presence of a public operator can discipline competi-
tion and lead to an outcome that is closer to the social optimum. See De Fraja and Delbono
(1990) for a survey with homogeneous products. Papers in the context of product di¤erentiation
include Cremer et al (1991), Grilo (1994) and Anderson et al. (1997). Note that in a transport-
ation setting, passengers value both frequency and fares; an adequate modelling of consumer
behaviour requires the use of an address model of product di¤erentiation. The analysis of
private and mixed oligopolies where means of transport are in competition can be particularly
helpful to assess the expected e¤ects of deregulation. Cantos-Sánchez and Moner-Colonques
(2005) consider intermodal competition between means that are vertically di¤erentiated and
compete in frequencies and prices. They nd that the presence of a (public) non-prot max-
imizing operator is a useful measure to get closer to the social optimum. When both operators
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are (private) prot maximizers, some control measures such as price caps and minimum service
availability would reduce the distortions from the social optimum. This chapter goes further
in that it characterizes the equilibrium in a network type of model where indirect ights cause
disutility to passengers. Comparisons are conducted both in a monopolistic and duopolistic
settings and network type is found to matter.
For a monopoly airline, we prove that the market equilibrium typically produces an under-
provision of frequencies relative to the social optimum regardless of the network type - whether
an FC or an HS network. So there arises the need for regulating frequencies when the will-
ingness to pay for transport is not large enough since the market equilibrium delivers too low
frequencies. Besides, the star network attains greater prots and welfare when compared to the
complete one when the willingness to pay for transport is not large enough and when passenger
disutility of indirect ights is su¢ ciently low. The bounds on these parameters are not the
same in the prots and the welfare comparison thus giving rise to a conict between private
and social incentives; the analysis identies potential market failures associated with the net-
work architecture. In a duopoly, and assuming a fully-connected network, it is shown that the
market equilibrium produces a suboptimal excess of frequencies in the transport services: both
airlines set higher frequencies relative to the social optimum. In a mixed duopoly, if the public
operator is relatively more e¢ cient than the prot-maximizing operator, then distortions in the
frequencies provided are reduced; the prot-maximizing operator sets too many ights but the
public operator sets too few compared to the social optimum. The same type of divergence
remains when the public operator is relatively more ine¢ cient, yet the distortion is higher.
This suggests that having a public airline competing in the market is an alternative way of
controlling the total frequency provided, other than regulating them directly.
The next section provides a discussion of PSO around Europe to then give a more detailed
picture of the Spanish case. This motivates the analysis that is presented in section 3.3. A model
is developed where a monopolist airline sets frequencies and fares under prot maximization and
compare them with the socially optimal choices. Two network architectures are considered: a
fully-connected network and a star network. Section 3.4 presents the duopoly case in the context
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of a fully-connected network. In addition to the private duopoly equilibrium, the mixed duopoly
will also be characterized and compared with the social optimum. Some concluding remarks
close the chapter.
3.2 Some background on PSO in the airline sector
Before the liberalization reform initiated in the nineties, universal services in network industries
were provided by public or regulated monopolies and nanced through subsidies from the public
budget and through cross-subsidies from protable to unprotable consumers. The analysis that
follows in Section 3.3 is motivated by many regulation cases in Europe and, in particular, we will
look in detail into the case of the Spanish Canary Islands in subsection 3.2.1. In the early 90s,
the EU adopted a series of legislative measures to protect smaller communities since it was feared
that competition and reorganization of airline networks (as a result of the Third Package of Air
Transport Liberalisation Measures 1993-96) might leave these communities without air services
they already had. It is in this context that the imposition of PSO in some routes becomes
particularly relevant, given that its goal is to ensure an adequate supply of transport services.
Although the measures adopted were not equivalent, the US also developed laws in view of
protecting small communities from the adverse e¤ects derived from the Airline Deregulation
Act of 1978.
Regarding how di¤erent states have made use of the PSO mechanism, Reynolds-Feighan
(1995a, 1995b), study the impact of the deregulation process, both in Europe and the US, in
smaller communities, by comparing their management and legislative structures. Also, Willi-
ams and Pagliari (2004) and Williams (2005), evaluate and test how di¤erent member states in
the EEA have adopted and used the PSO in air transport. These authors, as well as Reynolds-
Feighan (1995b), would favour the centralization of PSO management at the European Com-
mission level to achieve a more e¢ cient and egalitarian distribution of subsidies - there have
been cases of reported abuses of PSO due to di¤erent interpretations of the law by member
states.
The implementation of PSO in some routes tried to ensure an adequate provision of air
transport services in terms of regularity, frequency and fares, in those cases where airline com-
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panies would fail to if strictly following their commercial interests (Council Regulation 2408/92).
Besides, the authority to impose a PSO lies in every member state. So there are no xed criteria
and this fact has given rise to a number of di¤erent interpretations regarding its applicability.
Currently there are ten member states applying a PSO in some of their routes: Germany,
Spain, Finland, France, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, Sweeden and United Kingdom, as well
as other countries that belong to the European Common Space: Iceland and Norway.
In Spain and the UK most of the PSO are found in inter-island air services. There are 15
regulated routes operating in the Highlands and the islands (see Table 3.1) under the Highlands
and Islands Air Services Act of 1980. The routes are nanced by the Scottish government, that
allows the public sector to have a say on the level and quality of the services supplied, including
the fares. Whereas the competence in air tra¢ c policy lies with the central British government,
the Scottish government takes responsibility in the management of PSO in Scotland.
Table 3.1: Routes under Public Service Obligation Regulation in UK
In Portugal, a PSO was imposed in some routes of the autonomous region of Madeira and
the Azores islands back in 1999, in accordance with royal decree 23rd April of 1999 and routes
are subsidized, just as with the case of Scotland. In addition, the government subsidizes air
transport of residents in Azores and Portuguese students (regardless of where they live) in a
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similar way to residents in the Canary Islands. The routes subject to regulation in Azores are
displayed in Table 3.2, yet theres no airline reported that covers Madeira.
Table 3.2: Routes under Public Service Obligation Regulation in Portugal
In France routes under PSO have been gradually designated since 1994, and along with
Norway, is the country that has made a greater use of such regulatory mechanism. The routes
chosen are the ones connecting smaller regional airports with Paris, as well as the connections
between the main French cities and the island of Corsica. Likewise in Portugal, there are
subsidies for residents and students from peripheric regions. Table 3.3 shows the characteristics
of PSO routes for France.
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Table 3.3: Routes under Public Service Obligation Regulation in France
The way this regulation is implemented in Norway is di¤erent from the rest of European
countries. When the Norwish government rst applied the regulation in 1997, it established an
auction so that companies could bid for an all-route operation service. However, in the next
rounds, the network was divided in 15 independent areas so that the companies could bid for
those routes they were actually interested in, the government being able to increase the number
of competitive bids. In 2005 the Ministry of Transports and Communications redened the
conguration of areas and changed to 16 areas (see Table 3.4). At the end of this process,
Wideroe, the company that had thus far operated all routes got the license for eleven of them;
the rest are operated by CoastAir (with a license for three areas), Kato Airline and Danish Air
Transport , with one each. It is very likely that Norway has the most transparent process thus
favouring the highest number of bids (Williams, 2005).
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Table 3.4: Routes under Public Service Obligation Regulation in Norway
3.2.1 The case of the Spanish Canary Islands
In Spain, the Public Service Obligation rst came into force in 1998 on the routes that cover
the ights between the seven islands that form the Canary Islands. Table 3.5 below shows the
routes involved according to Orden Ministerial July 30th 1998. Although the regulation did not
impede competition, the airline company Binter Canarias was the sole operator between July
1998 and 2003 when a second operator entered the market, Islas Airways. There is another PSO
implemented in routes of the Balearic Islands since 2003 and currently one under development
between the Southern cities of Almeria and Seville.
The PSO regulation is done by the DGAC (Dirección General de Aviación Civil). In general
terms, the legislation establishes the following:
1) Declaration of routes under PSO, stating the minimum annual supply (in terms of seats
and aircraft capacity), frequencies, time schedules, and maximum fare. All of these are without
any restrictions on entry by di¤erent operators. The central and/or the corresponding regional
government will subsidize 50% of the fare for resident passengers.
2) In case all the airlines together fail to provide the minimum number of seats established, a
contest takes place and the service will be allocated to one only company. Additional subsidies
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are granted on an annual basis to cover operational costs.
As for the Canary Islands, the PSO includes 13 routes and must meet the aforementioned
requirements and, in particular,
- the maximum capacity, measured in number of seats, per IATA season both in winter and
summer.
- the minimum frequency and timetable with a limit of 75% continued load factor.
- the maximum fares, where promotional discounts are permitted.
To describe the market note that there are seven main islands with an airport, and the
island of Tenerife holds two, North and South. Currently, 21 routes are operated, 13 of them
under the regulatory framework specied (as shown in the map below) and listed in Table 3.5.
Figure 3.1: Routes under Public Service Obligation Regulation in Canary Islands
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Table 3.5: Routes under Public Service Obligation Regulation in the Canary Islands
At present there are two main airline operators: Binter and Islas Airways. Additionally
other companies provide ights but these are basically connecting ights with the peninsula
and Europe, via tour operators, major airlines and low cost airlines like Air Europa, Spanair,
Vueling and EasyJet.
 Binter Canarias: in May 1989 it began operating in the Canary Islands with Iberia as
its main stakeholder. At that time, Binter Canarias was the only airline providing passenger
services with its four CN-235 eet. These were substituted for by the more convenient ATR
aircraft in 1997. In June 1999 the eet consisted of 11 ATR planes, complemented at times by
DC-9 hired to Iberia. In the year 2002, and after its acquisition by a group of investors from
the islands, an important eet renewal took place; eight new ATR-72/500 were purchased,
with seating capacity for 72 passengers, that substituted the oldest aircraft. At present, Binter
Canarias operates with a eet of 18 ATR-72 aircraft. Over the years, the conditions regulating
passenger air transport in the islands have changed substantially. Back in 1989 the market
was regulated and basically in the hands of one operator, Iberia, to which Binter Canarias was
attached. Nowadays, the market has been deregulated but the specicity of the islands market
is that it remains regulated regarding frequencies, total number of seats supplied and maximum
60
fares by the PSO legislation. Binter Canarias was born as a regional airline company and as
such it is the only company that operates in the eight Canarian airports. On top of that, since
2005, an internationalization process was initiated that currently translates to connections with
Marrakech, Aaiún and Madeira.
 Islas Airways: the company was created on the 7th September 2001. It is in 2003 that Islas
Airways operates its rst ight. Only three years later, the company has captured an important
market share; the escalation is constantly progressing and reaching one million passengers after
two years of operation. The initial eet consisted of two aircraft then expanded to ve ATR with
seating capacity for 72 passengers. Islas Airways continues its growth trend and its commitment
of service with the incorporation, in the rst quarter of 2006, of a corporate group chaired by
Miguel Concepción Cáceres, representing Sociedades Agrupadas de Canarias (SOAC).
The next section develops a model where a monopolist airline sets frequencies and fares
under prot maximization and compare them with the socially optimal choices. These compar-
isons would somehow reect a pre-entry situation and two network architectures are considered:
a fully-connected network and a star network. Then a duopolistic setting is analyzed in the con-
text of a fully-connected network - which is the network chosen under some conditions and was
e¤ectively implemented in the Canary islands. In addition to the private duopoly equilibrium,
the mixed duopoly will also be characterized and compared with the social optimum.
3.3 The model
Consider an economy (country or region) that consists of a set of three di¤erent cities H; I and
J . Each city pair is connected by one airline route and so it is served by one means of transport.
Thus there are three city-pair markets IH; HJ; IJ , in which passengers originate in one city and
terminate in the other; these markets or routes are labelled 1; 2; and 3 respectively. To simplify
the analysis we disregard round trips. Each route can be considered as a di¤erent market. A
passenger can travel either directly or indirectly through a third city; such a city is called a hub,
city H. Two basic types of networks are distinguished . One is a fully-connected-network (FC)
where passengers can y directly between any city pair. Another is a hub-and-spoke network
(HS) in which only direct ights are possible for those passengers whose nal destination is the
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hub city. Figures 3.2.a and 3.2.b illustrate an FC and an HS network with a hub located at
city H:
Figure 3.2.a: Fully Connected Network
Figure 3.2.b: Hub and Spoke Network
We assume that, on each route i; i = f1; 2; 3g; there is a continuum of passengers which
are uniformly distributed over the interval [0; 1]; with density one. Consider the airline to be
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located at zero so that proximity to zero means preference for travelling (with that airline)2.
Note that each route has a maximum demand of 1. The (indirect) utility of a passenger in route
i is inuenced negatively by the fare, pi; and positively by the number of departures, ni; since
a higher frequency of service implies shorter waiting time. Each user, indexed by  2 [0; 1] has
the following utility function, denoted by ui ;
ui =
8<: v + ni   pi   td if ying0 if does not y at all ; (3.1)
where v is the baseline willingness to pay for travelling, and d is the distance in the character-
istic space between zero and the location of user  : Parameter t is a measure of the sensitivity
of the disutility incurred by a passenger not taking his/her ideal airline.
In this situation the airline company is the monopolist in the market and has to decide
whether to serve the full market. Then for any given price and frequency, demand for air
transport in route i is as follows:
qi(pi) =
8>>><>>>:
0 if pi  v + nl
v+ni pi
t if v + ni   t < pi < v + ni
1 if pi  v + ni   t
(3.2)
Where it is now clear that a su¢ ciently low price will induce all potential users to y.
3.3.1 The complete network
Let us consider that all ights are direct, i.e. the FC network - in fact, this would quite faithfully
correspond to the network design in the Canary Islands. The total cost of operation for the




3): The cost function is convex
to reect diseconomies of scale in the provision of higher frequencies. The increase in ight
frequency is imposing higher complexity on the organization of inputs. Basically, how crews ,
planes and land services are organized involving the same route. That complexity increase will
2 In the next section we will assume the presence of a competitor means of transport. It might be thought
of either as a rival airline or as an alternative means of transport. Then, in the characteristics space the air
transport monopolist will be located at zero while the other tranport mode will be located at one.
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suggest a typical diseconomies of scale cost structure in frequencies.
The airline prots in route i reads as follows:
i(pi) =
8>>><>>>:
 cn2i if pi  v + ni
(pi   g)(v+ni pit )  cn2i if v + ni   t < pi < v + ni
(pi   g)  cn2i if pi  v + ni   t
(3.3)
where g stands for the marginal cost per passenger. Total prots are just the sum  =
P
i i;
i = 1; 2; 3: We are going to consider the market equilibrium case, that is when the monopolist
sets prices and frequency to maximize prots, and the social optimal outcome.
The market equilibrium
The airline rst chooses the frequency and then sets its price. The sequentiality of the choice
is meant to capture that prices adapt more rapidly than frequencies and so are a short-run
variable choice. Thus the monopolist sets the price to maximize prots for any given frequency





t or that it is fully served at the corner solution pi = v+ni  t; with qi = 1: This leads




4t   cn2i if ni < 2t  v + g
(v + ni   t)  cn2i if ni  2t  v + g
(3.4)
Solving @i(ni)=@ni = 0 for ni we obtain that:
a) ni =
v g








2c if (v   g) > 2t  12c and the full market is served. Prots are equal to v   t+ 14c
and price (v+g)2 +
1
4c :
Star superscripts indicate equilibrium variables. We next compute consumer surplus and
social welfare corresponding to this case. First of all note that consumer surplus for route i is
dened as follows: CSi =
R qi
0 (v + ni   pi   tx) dx with 0  qi  1: Social welfare for route i
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(4ct 1)2 if (v   g) < 2t  12c
v   g   t2 + 54c if (v   g) > 2t  12c
(3.6)
The social optimum outcome
This is the situation that would arise when a social welfare maximizer chose prices and
frequencies. First note that the optimal price is just to set price equal to the marginal cost,
pi = g and this entails an optimal number of users which is equal to either qi =
v g+ni
t < 1 if
ni < t  (v  g) or qi = 1 if ni > t  (v  g): Taking this into account, the social planner chooses





2ct 1 if (v   g) < t  12c
1
2c if (v   g) > t  12c
(3.7)
Superscripts SO denote equilibrium variables in the social optimum. The interior solution
entails an optimal level of demand (qi)so =
2c(v g)
2ct 1 < 1: Consumer surplus and social welfare




(2ct 1)2 if (v   g) < t  12c





2ct 1 if (v   g) < t  12c




We now compare the performance of the market equilibrium with respect to the social
optimum outcome. First note that, since 2t   12c is greater that t   12c ; it happens that the
social optimum outcome serves the full market for lower levels of (v   g); i.e. the baseline
willingness to pay net of marginal cost. Therefore we should distinguish three cases. First, the
case of (v g) < t  12c in which both the market and the social optimum imply that some users
do not travel. Second, the case of t   12c < (v   g) < 2t   12c ; which implies that the market
equilibrium leads to partial market coverage whereas the optimal situation leads to full market
coverage. Third, the case of 2t   12c < (v   g);which implies full market coverage under both
scenarios.
Proposition 4 The market equilibrium produces a suboptimal underprovision of frequencies in
the transport service i.e. ni < (ni)
so; if v   g < 2t   12c . Otherwise the market equilibrium
reaches the social optimum nij = (ni)
so:






4ct 1 when (v   g) < 2t  12c :
The natural and expected result that frequencies are below the socially optimal solution is
conrmed. As noted in the Introduction, this nding was suggested by Brueckner (2004) for
the case of a monopoly, yet under di¤erent assumptions from those in our model. In his paper,
passengers incur a cost of scheduling delay - so that demand is non-linear in frequency -, and
there are economies of operating a larger aircraft. However, with full market coverage, we nd
that the private equilibrium reproduces the optimal frequency, though not the prices which
exceed the optimal ones. The policy implication is that the market works e¢ ciently as to the
provision of frequencies when v   g is su¢ ciently large.
3.3.2 The star network
Consider now that the monopoly airline does not provide a direct ight between cities I and J:
Passengers ying on route 3 must y via the hub city H. We thus need to make some further





v + ni   pi   td if ies directly to destination i = 1; 2
v   + n1+n22   f   td if ies to destination via the hub
0 if does not y at all
; (3.10)
Parameter  represents the basic disutility that a passenger attaches to hubbing, with  < v.
Note that, when ying via the hub, a passenger is better o¤ by the average of the frequencies in
each of the two legs of the trip, n1 and n2. Finally, f is the price of an indirect ight from I to
J: Note that passengers buying a ticket from city I to city J can costlessly get o¤ or on a plane
at the hub H, thereby terminating or starting their journey at H. This implies taking into
account the following non-arbitrage conditions: i) the prices on routes 1 and 2 cannot exceed
the airfare on route 3, that is, p1; p2 < f; and ii) the fare on route 3 must be smaller than the
sum of the fares on routes 1 and 2, that is, f < p1 + p2. This ensures that the airline separates
those passengers on a short trip from those travelling between I and J .
For routes 1 and 2 with a direct ight demands are as in (2) above whereas for route 3, with
an indirect ight, demand is given by,
q3(f) =
8>>><>>>:
0 if f  v   + n1+n22
2(v )+n1+n2 2f
2t if v   +
n1+n2
2   t < f < v   +
n1+n2
2
1 if f  v   + n1+n22   t
: (3.11)
The market equilibrium
The prot function for this connection follows inmediatly from (3.11) assuming hereafter
that g = 0. Note that the three markets are separable in the third-stage of the game as the
monopolist is able to price the indirect ight separately. Solving for the prices that maximize
the monopolists prots we nd the same equilibrium prices for the direct connections as in
the previous section for the FC network and the following equilibrium prices for the indirect
connection:
a) f = v +n2 ; where n =
n1+n2
2 , and q3(f
) = f

t if the market is not fully served (that is,
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when n < 2t  v + ) and
b) f = v     t+ n; and q3(f) = 1 if n  2t  v + :
Combining these results with those for direct ights there arise several possible combina-
tions of markets fully served and not fully served depending on the levels n1; n2 and n: Full
market coverage is attained at direct connections when ni  2t  v, i = 1; 2; while for indirect
connections at n  2t  v + : Therefore, and taking for instance n1 = n2 = n; both the direct
markets are fully covered while the two-leg route is not when 2t  v < n < 2t  v + : That is,
more frequency is required to fully cover the indirect connection. Also note that depending on
the value of the baseline willingness to pay we can nd cases where only full market coverage is
an option. That is the case for v > 2t+ : Users value the trip so much that they travel at the
equilibrium prices for any frequency chosen. Similarly for 2t < v < 2t +  the monopolist has
to decide just whether to fully cover the indirect connection because the direct ones are always
fully covered3. Finally, the most complex case arises when v < 2t since initially all possible
combinations of full versus partial coverage are attained by properly setting n1 and n2.
There are four possible rst-stage prots:
a) Direct connections, i = 1; 2:
a.1) Partial market coverage: i(ni) =
(v+ni)
2
4t   cn2i :
a.2) Full market coverage: i(ni) = (v + ni   t)  cn2i :
b) Indirect connection.
b.1) Partial market coverage: 3(n) =
(v +n)2
4t :
b.2) Full market coverage: 3(n) = (v + n    t):
3 In the star network, there is no service - and hence no frequency - in route 3. So that departing from I we
have a unit mass of passengers willing to y to H and a unit mass of passengers willing to y to J: It is implicitly
assumed that aircraft size is enough to take all these passengers; rather the focus is on whether covering the
market or not.
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Proposition 5 The market equilibrium for the star network is symmetric in terms of frequency




8ct 3  < v < 2t  34c + 8ct
v +4t
8ct 1 2t  34c + 8ct < v < 2t  34c + 
3
4c v > 2t  34c + 
;




2t(8ct 3)  < v < 2t  34c + 8ct
2(v   t) + (v )24t + (v +4t)
2
4t(8ct 1) 2t  34c + 8ct < v < 2t  34c + 
3(v   t)  + 98c v > 2t  34c + 
:
Proof: See the Appendix.
We employ the superscript hat to denote the equilibrium variables in the star network
case. Note that when the baseline willingness to pay is small enough,  < v < 2t   34c + 8ct ;
then no connection is fully covered in equilibrium. For this case to happen it must be that
2t   34c + 8ct > ; that is  < 2t(8ct 3)8ct 1 ; otherwise, the monopolist never partially covers the
direct ights in equilibrium. As v increases, that is for 2t  34c+ 8ct < v < 2t  34c+; only direct
connections are fully covered. Finally when v > 2t  34c +; the three markets are fully covered.
In fact and in the latter case, the equilibrium frequency is just determined by the parameter
cost of frequency; otherwise, and since more frequencies increase the willingness to pay, the
equilibrium frequency also depends on demand parameters. Another comment worth making
is that symmetric solutions dominate the asymmetric ones for two reasons. When revenues are
a function of n any asymmetric combination of frequencies for connections IH and HJ that
yield the same average frequency is always dominated by the symmetric outcome since costs
are convex. If alternatively, revenues are not a function of n; which is the case when only one
direct connection is either fully or partially covered, then it is proven in the Appendix that the
monopolist is always better o¤ partially covering the direct ights.
The social optimum
In this subsection we compute the social optimum both in terms of prices and frequencies
for the star network. Consumer surplus for the case of direct connections is calculated as in
69
the case of the complete network, that is CSi =
R qi
0 (v + ni   pi   tx) dx = (v + ni   pi)qi  
tq2i
2
with 0  qi  1 and i = 1; 2: For the indirect connection a similar expression can be found:
CS3 =
R q3
0 (v    + n   f   tx) dx = (v    + n   f)q3  
tq23
2 with 0  q3  1: The latter






2 ] + (v   + n)q3  
tq23
2   cn21   cn22; where depending on the level of demands, either
smaller than one or equal to one, we can get back to any possible combination of fully or
partially covered connections. Also, the above expression captures the typical denition as
welfare is just the usersutility minus the link costs, since the monopolist revenues are direct
transfer from users and consequently they cancel out in the social welfare expression. Taking
the rst order conditions for a maximum in prices (i.e. @SW@p1 = 0;
@SW
@p2
= 0 and @SW@f = 0),
we nd that SW is increasing in the number of users (demand). Then, either prices do not
play any role in increasing demand   since the market is fully covered given frequencies and
then prices only have distributional e¤ects  , or they are used to increase the demand when
frequencies are such that markets are partially covered. In the latter case, and once a reduction
in price implies that demand reaches unity, any further reduction in prices only has, as in the
former case, distributional e¤ects. To be more precise, the prices that maximize demands are
0  pi  maxfv + ni   t; 0g for i = 1; 2 and 0  f  maxfv    + n   t; 0g: In fact, it is
any non-negative price that implies that the full market is covered at the given frequency, or
zero if the frecuencies are so low that the market cannot be fully covered even at zero price.
Intutitively, a social planner will use prices to increase as much as possible the number of users
for any given frequency.
The next step is to compute the optimal frecuency of ights, noting that only symmet-
ric solutions make sense, i.e. (n^1)so = (n^2)so = n^so; and that we focus on the case where
optimal prices are zero. First consider the case where all the markets are fully covered, i.e.
(v )+n1+n2
2
t  1 then SW = 3v +n1+n2+n  3t2   cn21  cn22; which reaches a maximum at
n^so = 34c and this value is consistent with full market coverage as long as
3
4c > t+   v: Next,
consider the case where only direct ights are fully covered, that is, for
(v )+n1+n2
2
t < 1 and
v+ni
t  1; i = 1; 2; with SW = 2v   t+ n1 + n2 + (v   + n)q3  
tq23
2   cn21   cn22; which yields





t  1; or t   34c + 4ct < v  t   34c + : Finally, take the case of all markets partially
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covered which will imply an optimal frequency given byl n^so = 3v 4ct 3 ; for  < v  t  34c + 4ct : A
condition on  is required to make this case possible,  < t(4ct 3)4ct 1 ; otherwise it is never optimal
to leave the direct connections partially covered. To sum up, the optimal frequency and welfare




4ct 3  < v  t  34c + 4ct
v +2t
4ct 1 t  34c + 4ct < v  t  34c + 
3




t(4ct 3)  < v  t  34c + 4ct
2c(v )2+t(8cv+3) 4ct2 2
4ct 1 t  34c + 4ct < v  t  34c + 
3v     3t2 + 98c v > t  34c + 
:
Results
We are ready to compare the performance of the market equilibrium with respect to the
social optimum outcome. There are two di¤erent sources of discrepancy, one is the number
of frequencies for each interval and the other is the intervals themselves. Direct inspection
of the expressions is enough to conclude that n^ < n^so when there is partial coverage of at
least one market, while n^ = n^so when the three markets are fully covered in both cases,
that is for v > 2t   34c + : It is also important to highlight that since optimal prices are
smaller than monopoly ones, a lower frequency is required to fully cover a given market in
the former case. Regarding the interval ordering, it is important to note that we assume that
 < t(4ct 3)4ct 1 <
2t(8ct 3)
8ct 1 ; that is partial coverage for all markets is both an optimal and a market
equilibrium for some values of the parameters. If this is the case then the ranking in thresholds
is t  34c + 4ct < t  34c +  < 2t  34c + 8ct < 2t  34c + : This ranking means that it is optimal
to fully cover the three markets when the monopolist at equilibrium only partially covers those
markets. Comparing equilibrium frequencies with optimal ones for each possible situation we
get the following result.
Proposition 6 The market equilibrium produces a suboptimal underprovision of frequencies in
the airline service (i.e. n^ < n^so) if  < v < 2t   34c + . Otherwise the market equilibrium
reaches the social optimum number of frequencies, n^ = n^so:
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Proof : See the Appendix:
Propositions 4 and 6 together tell us that, regardless of the network type, there arises the
need for regulating frequencies when v is not large enough since the market equilibrium delivers
too few frequencies relative to the social optimum. Otherwise the policy implication for a
regulator is do nothing as far as frequencies are concerned for the market is working e¢ ciently
in that respect.
3.3.3 The complete vs the star network
We wish to nd conditions under which the complete network attains greater welfare than the
star network and next we also compare the two networks in terms of the monopolists prots.
Regarding the social incentive to implement a given network we rstly have a neat result for
the case of  = 0; since then the star network is always preferred. The reason is that the
excess of frequency cost in the star network (greater than or equal to the number of frequencies
than under the complete network but more costly due to the decreasing returns) is more than
compensated by the advantage the star network has in terms of marginal welfare derived by
one more ight. The star network is serving more users per frequency than the complete one,
and since the users do not care about indirect ights, the star network does better.
Proposition 7 The star network attains greater welfare when compared to the complete one
if  is su¢ ciently low and when v is su¢ ciently large. A su¢ cient condition for the complete





Proof : See the Appendix.
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Figure 3.3: Star vs Complete: Social Welfare
When we analyze which network would be chosen by the monopolist we nd that when
consumers do not care for indirect ights ( = 0) then the star network always yields higher
prots than the complete one. The reason is similar to the case of welfare, the excess of frequency
cost in the star network is more than compensated by the advantage the star network has in
terms of marginal prots per ight. When consumers do not care about indirect ights, we
have that, with less ights, all consumers travel. This part of the result certainly conforms
with the received literature, as specied in the Introduction. The next proposition displays the
monopolists choice for positive :
Proposition 8 The star network attains greater prots when compared to the complete one if
 is su¢ ciently low and when v is su¢ ciently large. A su¢ cient condition for the complete





Proof : See the Appendix.
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Figure 3.4: Star vs Complete: Prots
Finally, we identify market failures in terms of network choice as follows. There are regions
on the fv; g parameter set where the star network is the optimal choice while the monopolist







6ct ] and   14c : In sum, and provided that the market equilibrium
typically fails to reproduce the social optimum, the previous two Propositions identify the
potential market failure in terms of network architecture.
3.4 A duopolistic market
We now consider that all three routes are served by two airlines   or, in general, by two means
of transport. The analysis might reect what happened in the Canary Islands market after
2003, when Binter faced competition from Islas Airways.4
For each route there is continuum of passengers with density one which are uniformly distrib-
uted across the interval [0; 1]; where now proximity to zero means preference for air transport
4Given that the analysis is motivated by the Canary Islands market, we focus on a fully connected network.
An alternative interpretation is that, given the sequentiality of events, the parameter  is assumed large enough
thus leading, in the rst place, to opt for a fully connected network.
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(incumbent airline) while users close to unity show preference for the alternative transport mode
(entrant airline). Therefore, in the characteristics space the air transport monopolist is located
at zero while the rival transport mode is located at one. Thus in route i each user  2 [0; 1] has
the following (indirect) utility function,
ui =
8>>><>>>:
v + nIi   pIi   tdI if i ies with the incumbent,
v + nEi   pEi   tdE if i ies with the entrant,
0 if i does not y at all.
; (3.12)
where the variables are as above, and now I and E are used to denote the incumbent and the
entrant airline, respectively. Also, dI is the distance in the characteristic space between zero
and the location of user  while dE is her distance to 1, therefore, dI + dE = 1:
We shall consider several competition environments in the market. In one of them, the
two means of transport are managed by prot maximizing rms; this is the market equilibrium
case. Then, we will consider the case of a prot maximizing rm in air transport competing
with a social welfare maximizing operator; this is the mixed equilibrium case. Finally, we will
characterize the social optimum outcome.
The market equilibrium
The demand for air services in route i is determined by the following equation:
v + nIi   pIi   tdI = v + nEi   pEi   t(1  dE) (3.13)













ij   nEi + pEi   t < pIi < nIi   nEi + pEi + t;
1 if pIi  nIi   nEi + pEi   t:
(3.14)
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 cI(nIi )2 if pIi  nIi   nEi + pEi + t
(pIi   g)(12 +
nIi nEi  pIi+pEi
2t )  cI(nIi )2 if nIij   nEi + pEi   t < pIi < nIi   nEi + pEi + t
(pIi   g)  cI(nIi )2 if pIi  nIi   nEi + pEi   t
(3.15)
where cI is the cost parameter in the incumbents cost function for frequencies. Total prots




i ; i = 1; 2; 3: The expressions for the entrant airline follow straigh-
forwardly by making the necessary changes.
The airlines rst compete in frequencies and then compete in prices. We now compute the
(subgame perfect) equilibrium in the nal stage. Solving @I=@pIi = 0 and @
E=@pEi = 0
delivers the following interior equilibrium: (pmi )
 = t+ g + n
m
i  nhi
3 ; for m;h = I; E and I 6= E:
Therefore, the equilibrium price set by an airline increases with the disutitlity parameter, t;
with marginal cost, g; and with the number of ights of that airline whereas it decreases with
the frequency of the rival airline. Note that the di¤erence in equilibrium prices just reects the





2t : The rst-stage reduced prot














6t )  cm(nmi )2 if nhi   3t < nmi < nhi + 3t
(t+
nmi  nhi
3 )  cm(nmi )2 if nhi + 3t  nmi
(3.16)
for m;h = I; E and m 6= h:
Note that large di¤erences in frequencies may induce the exit of one of the airlines.
Firms now maximize prots by selecting the frequency. The following interior equilibrium
is obtained (nmi )
 = 9c
mt 1
18cIcEt cI cE ; for m = I; E: Therefore the rm with higher frequency cost
sets the higher equilibrium frequency. The interior equilibrium is the global equilibrium if and







g: When one of the airlines is too ine¢ cient with respect to
the other then only the e¢ cient airline will operate in the market. For instance, the entrant
would be out of the market when cE > cI and t < 1
9cE
: Focusing on the interior equilibrium we
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obtain the following equilibrium prices, quantities, prots.
qmi
 = cm(nmi )
;
pmi







We next compute consumer surplus and social welfare corresponding to this case. First of




(v + nIi   pIi   tx) dx+
Z 1 qi
0
(v + nEi   pEi   tx) dx; with 0  qi  1: (3.17)
And after substituting back the equilibrium prices and quantities we obtain:










   nEi )2
36t










   nEi )2
36t
  cI(nIi )2   cE(nEi )2
The mixed equilibrium case
In this case we consider that one of the airlines behaves as a social maximizer operator.
Consider, without loss of generality, that the entrant sets frequency and price to maximize
social welfare. To nd the equilibrium pair of prices for each route, we solve the following




= 0; and @SWi
@pEi
= 0: Noting that social welfare simplies to SWi =
v   g   t2 + nEi + (nIi   nEi )qIi + tqIi (1   qIi )   cI(nIi )2   cE(nEi )2; the equilibrium prices are
pIi
 = pEi
 = t+ g+nIi  nEi ; where the di¤erence in frequencies does not a¤ect the di¤erence
in prices.5
As in the private case large di¤erences in frequencies might end up in one airline exiting
the market. In particular, if nIi > n
E
i + t; then the entrant will not operate. Substituting
5Double star superscripts are used to denote the equilibrium variables in the mixed duopoly case.
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the equilibrium prices back in Ii and SWi we obtain the rst-stage reduced prots and welfare





















= 0 and reads nIi =
2cEt 1





Note the di¤erence with the private duopoly: the less e¢ cient airline does not necessarily set a
higher equilibrium frequency than the rival: The interior equilibrium is the global equilibrium




g: Substituting back the equilibirum frequencies we obtain the
following prices, quantities and prots for route i :
qIi
 = cInIi
; 1  qIi  = 2cEnEi 
pIi
 = 2tcInIi




 = cI(2cIt  1)(nIi )2
Similarly, consumer surplus and welfare reads,









   nEi )2
4t










   nEi )2
4t
  cI(nIi )2   cE(nEi )2
The social optimum outcome
This is the situation that would arise if a social welfare maximizer chose prices and fre-




= 0 for (pIi ; p
E
i ) we obtain
the second stage optimal prices, (pIi )
so = (pEi )
so = psoi which imply that any price level is
optimal with the proviso that both airlines be priced equally. Substituting back into the social




= 0 for (nIi ; n
E









2(4cIcEt cI cE) : The interior equilibrium is the global equilibrium if and only




g: Substituting back the equilibrium frequencies we obtain the following
quantities and prots, the latter being a parametric function of psoi :
78
(qIi )
so = cI(nIi )
so; 1  (qIi )so = cE(nEi )so
(Ii )
so =





(psoi   g)(t+ (nEi )so   (nIi )so)
2t
  cE((nEi )so)2
Similarly for consumer surplus and welfare:










so   (nEi )so)2
4t










so   (nEi )so)2
4t
  cI((nIi )so)2   cE((nEi )so)2
Results
We rstly state the next result that deals with the full comparison of frequencies for the
symmetric case.
Proposition 9 If cI = cE = c; the market equilibrium produces a suboptimal excess of fre-
quencies in the transport services. Both (nIi )
so < nIi and (n
E
i )
so < nEi : The full ranking is
(nIi )







so < nEi .
Then, when competition is the driving force in setting frequencies, rms are spending too
much in frequencies as compared with the optimal choice. Also the existence of a public rm,
that is a rm that makes decisions to maximize welfare, is imposing an increase in the private
rm frequency choice as a reaction to the decrease in frequencies by the public rm. Interestingly
enough, the frequency level of the public rm falls short of the optimal one.
In the case of cost asymmetry between the incumbent rm and the entrant, we nd that
(nIi )





so. This means that the ranking between the market and
the mixed equilibrium case is robust to cost asymmetry. Finally, and regarding the ranking
between the market equilibrium and the social optimum outcome, the following result holds:
(nIi )
so < nIi and (n
E
i )






Together Propositions 4, 6 and 9 unveil the importance of market structure in assessing any
divergences relative to the social optimum. Under monopoly, the market equilibrium provides
too few frequencies and may even reach the socially optimal number of ights. In contrast, a
duopoly structure results in too many frequencies relative to the socially optimal solution. Note
that the predictions of our model reproduce what actually happened in the Canary Islands after
2003. As explained above, the market with all the islands fully connected had just one operator,
Binter Canarias. Quite logically one might think that the regulation was indeed having an e¤ect
and that had it not been in place Binter would have supplied less frequencies. The minimum
frequency requirement imposed by the regulator was just met. Following the entry by Islas
Airways, it can be observed in Figure 3.5 that such requirement is widely fullled. Given that
aircraft size remained the same, the increase in the number of seats o¤ered can only be explained
by an increase in frequency. Figure 3.6 is referred to the route Gran Canaria-Tenerife as an
illustrative example. The same has happened in the other routes.
Figure 3.5: Total Inter-Canary Islands Market
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Figure 3.6: Route Gran Canaria-Tenerife Norte
What our analysis suggests is an alternative way to straight regulation of frequencies. Note
that entry by a rm with social welfare maximizing objectives disciplines the market in two
ways. On the one hand, the mixed duopoly allows for setting the optimal prices. On the other,
the public rm chooses frequencies below the socially optimal so that distortions from the
socially optimal solution are reduced.
3.5 Concluding remarks
The objective of imposing an adequate provision of air services is a commendable one. As noted
in Section 3.2 above, the PSO mechanism has become increasingly used and the experience
from it is varied. This is certainly a research area that deserves more attention. This chapter
is a contribution that emphasizes the importance of the type of network as an element in
the implementation of PSO services. It also brings attention to market structure. Major
consideration has been devoted to the comparison of the socially optimal number of frequencies
with those provided by market competition. The analysis thus identies a potential market
failure in that a monopolist typically supplies too few frequencies whereas a duopoly supplies
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too many, relative to the social optimum. Any policy recommendations should be taken with
the necessary qualications but the results o¤er justication to regulate passenger air transport.
When carriers are both prot maximizers, some control measures over (prices or) frequencies
should be established in order to minimize distortions. Alternatively, our model suggests that
a mixed duopoly is a useful way of public intervention. Some of the policies adopted comprise
caps on fares and/or subsidies. The interesting conclusions obtained are an invitation for further
research on the role played by regulated fares in air transport competition.
3.6 Appendix
3.6.1 Second stage market equilibrium for the Star Network.
Before proceeding note that depending on v three di¤erent situations arise. First if v > 2t+ 
only full market coverage is an option. Also, for 2t < v < 2t +  the monopolist only has to
decide whether to fully cover the indirect connection because the direct ones are always fully
covered. Finally, when v < 2t all possibilities might arise. We will use this restriction on v as
necessary in the below analysis.
I) The case of the three markets fully covered (ni > 2t   v for i = 1; 2 and n >
2t  v + ):
Monopolist prots are:  =
P
i(ni) + 3(n) = (v + n1   t)   cn21 + (v + n2   t)   cn22 +
(v + n    t):
Note that the monopolist revenues in the above expression can be expressed as a function
of n; implying that any combination of n1; n2 that results in the same n will yield the same
revenue. If that is the case, the following result applies:
Result: If revenues are function of n then the symmetric solution (i.e. n1 = n2) dominates
all other possible combinations (n1; n2) that imply the same n:
The reason is that symmetry will minimize connection costs as they are convex in n1 and
n2:
Then taking n1 = n2 = n and maximizing  with respect to n; we nd n1 = n2 = n^ = 34c
and  = 3(v   t)  + 98c : This solution applies as long as n > 2t  v + ; or equivalently for
v > 2t  34c + : Otherwise, the solution is the corner solution: n^ = 2t  v + : Summarizing:
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n^I =
8<: n^I;cor = 2t  v +  v < 2t  34c + n^I;int = 34c v > 2t  34c +  ;
^I =
8<: ^I;cor = 3t+ 2  2c(2t  v + )2 v < 2t  34c + ^I;int = 3(v   t)  + 98c v > 2t  34c + 
where the subindex I refers to case I and the subindices cor and int refer to corner and
interior solution, respectively. Regarding consumer surplus and since all users travel CSi =R 1
0 (v + ni   pi   tx) dx = v + ni   pi   t2 = t2 (since pi = v + ni   t) for i = 1; 2; and
similarly CS3 =
R 1
0 (v    + n   f   tx) dx = t2 : Thus aggregate consumer surplus is CS =
CS1 + CS2 + CS3 =
3t
2 :
II) The case where only direct connections are fully covered (ni > 2t v for i = 1; 2
and n < 2t  v + ):
Monopolist prots are:  =
P
i(ni)+3(n) = (v+n1 t) cn21+(v+n2 t) cn22+ (v +n)
2
4t
where it is easy to note that total revenue is a function of n; and then only symmetric solutions
matter. Solving we get n1 = n2 = n^ = v +4t8ct 1 ; with ^
 = 2(v   t) + (v )24t + (v +4t)
2
4t(8ct 1) :
However, this interior solution only applies if 2t   v < n^ < 2t   v + : Or equivalently, for




n^II;cor = 2t  v v < 2t  34c + 8ct
n^II;int =
v +4t
8ct 1 2t  34c + 8ct < v < 2t  34c + 




^II;cor = 3t  + 
2
4t   2c(2t  v)2 v < 2t  34c + 8ct




4t(8ct 1) 2t  34c + 8ct < v < 2t  34c + 
^II;cor = 3t+ 2  2c(2t  v + )2 v > 2t  34c + 
where subindex II is used for this case. Regarding consumer surplus, note that for the
case of direct connections the outcome is the same as above since it does not depend on the




0 (v    + n   f   tx) dx; with q3 = 2(v )+n1+n2 2f2t < 1 and after substituting the





III) The case of all markets partially covered (ni < 2t  v for i = 1; 2):





4t   cn21 + (v+n2)
2
4t   cn22 + (v +n)
2
4t : The symmetric solution is the correct one
since prots are just symmetric in n1 and n2: Maximizing  with respect ton1 and n2 we get
n1 = n2 = n^





4t : This interior
solution applies for v < 2t  34c + 8ct ; otherwise the corner solution applies, where subindex III




8ct 3 v < 2t  34c + 8ct





2t(8ct 3) v < 2t  34c + 8ct
^III;cor = 3t  + 
2













IV) One direct connection market partially covered, say market 2; the others
fully covered (n2 < 2t  v; and n > 2t  v + ):
As in case III) v must be smaller that 2t:
Monopolist prots are:  =
P
i(ni)+3(n) = (v+n1 t) cn21+ (v+n2)
2
4t  cn22+(v+n  t):







However, note that v+t4ct 1 < 2t   v only if v < 2t   34c : Therefore in case 2t   34c < v < 2t;
the solution is the corner one n2 = 2t   v which implies all markets fully covered. In such a
case n2 = 2t  v and n1 = 34c cannot be an equilibrium since the monopolist is better setting a
symmetric solution with the proviso that all markets are fully covered.
Finally in case v < 2t   34c (i.e n^2 = v+t4ct 1 applies) it must be veried that for n^1 = 34c
the indirect market is fully covered. This is equivalent to checking if n^1 > 4t   2v + 2   n^2
and substituting for n^2 and n^1;
3
4c > 4t   2v + 2   v+t4ct 1 ;or, v > 8ct 28ct 1 + 2t   34c : However
the two conditions on v cannot be simultaneously satised as long as ct > 14 ; which is the
case. Therefore, the monopolist will end up in a corner solution n^1 = 4t  2v + 2  v+t4ct 1 for
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4t + (v + 4t  2v + 2  v+t4ct 1)  c(4t  2v + 2  v+t4ct 1)2   c( v+t4ct 1)2:
V) One direct connection fully covered, say market 1; the others partially
covered (n2 < 2t  v; n1 > 2t  v and n < 2t  v + ):
This case can only arise if v < 2t: Monopolist prots are  =
P
i(ni) + 3(n) = (v +
n1   t)   cn21 + (v+n2)
2
4t   cn22 + (v +n)
2
4t : Maximizing with respect to n1 and n2 we obtain







n = (16ct 1)v+4(4ct 1)t (8ct 1)8ct(8ct 3)+1 : Again we check the conditions that the interior solution must
satisfy: a) n^1 > 2t v i¤ v > 2t  34c + 8ct ; b) n^2 < 2t v i¤ v < 2t  34c + 8ct . Thus we conclude
that the interior solution is never attained. We have then two possibilities according to v:
i) for v > 2t  34c + 8ct ; n^1  2t  v and n^2 is the corner solution n^2 = 2t  v which imply
that the two direct connections are fully covered and therefore, a symmetric equilibrium always
yields higher prots.
ii) for v < 2t  34c + 8ct ; n^2  2t  v and n^1 is the corner solution n^1 = 2t  v. Given that,
the monopolist maximize prots at n^2 =
v+t
4ct 1 ; which as in case IV) corresponds to an interior
solution for n^2 only if v < 2t  34c : Summarizing we have:
n^1 = n^2 = 2t  v with ^ = 3t  + 
2













4t   c(2t  v)2  c( v+t4ct 1)2
for v < 2t  34c :
3.6.2 Proof of Proposition 5
First note that any interior solution yields no lower prots than the correponding corner solution
by denition. Take rst the case of v > 2t   34c + : Then we have to compare ^I;int with
^II;cor and ^









II;cor if v > 2t   34c + :
Also, ^I;int > ^

III;cor when v > 2t   34c +  and ct > 1=8; which is the case. Therefore, for
v > 2t  34c + ; I;int dominates the other cases II) and III).














other cases I) and III) for 2t  34c + 8ct < v < 2t  34c + :
85
Finally, when v < 2t   34c + 8ct ; we compare ^III;int with ^II;cor and ^I;cor. Note that
as before ^II;cor = ^










^III;int   ^I;cor is a convex quadratic function on v with no real roots.
There only remains to show that for v < 2t  34c ; ^III;int dominates the prots obtained in















4t   c(2t  v)2   c( v+t4ct 1)2 for case V).
In both cases it is easy to check that the corresponding di¤erences are a convex quadratic
function of v with no real roots, thus always positive.
3.6.3 Proof of Proposition 6
In this Appendix we compare the ight frequecies that a monopolist will provide in a star




8ct 3 v  2t  34c + 8ct
v +4t
8ct 1 2t  34c + 8ct < v  2t  34c + 
3




4ct 3 v  t  34c + 4ct
v +2t
4ct 1 t  34c + 4ct < v  t  34c + 
3
4c v > t  34c + 
Note that there are two di¤erent sources of discrepancy, rst the number of frequencies for
each interval and the second the intervals themselves. Direct inspection of the expressions is
enough to conclude that n < nso when there is partial coverage of at least one market, while
n = nso when the three markets are fully covered in both cases, that is for v > 2t   34c + :
It is also important to highlight that since optimal prices are smaller than monopoly ones, a
lower frequence is required to fully cover a given market in the former case. Regarding the
interval ordering it is important to note that we will assume that  < t(4ct 3)4ct 1 <
2t(8ct 3)
8ct 1 ; that
is we will ensure that partial covarage for all markets is an optimal and a market equilibrium
for some values of the parameters. If this is the case then we can easily prove that the ranking






8ct 1 : This ranking meaning that it is optimal to fully cover the three
markets when the monopolist at equilibrium only partially covers those markets. We nd:
-a suboptimal underprovision of frequencies for v < t  34c + 4ct as 3v 8ct 3 < 3v 4ct 3 ,
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-for t  34c + 4ct < v < t  34c + ; v +2t4ct 1 > 3v 8ct 3 i¤ v < 4t  32c   2ct 12ct : But t  34c +  <
4t  32c   2ct 12ct  if  < 32 t: And noting that t(4ct 3)4ct 1 < 32 t we conclude that there is a suboptimal
underprovision of frequencies.
-for t   34c +  < v < 2t   34c + 8ct ; we check when 34c > 3v 8ct 3 : In fact, evaluating 3v 8ct 3 at






8ct 3 ; then concluding that there
is a suboptimal underprovision of frequencies.
-for 2t   34c + 8ct < v < 2t   34c + ; the inequality to check is 34c > v +4t8ct 1 : As before,
evaluating v +4t8ct 1 at v = 2t  34c + ; we conclude that there is a suboptimal underprovision of
frequencies.
Summarizing, if  < t(4ct 3)4ct 1 <
8ct2
8ct 1 then there is a suboptimal underprovision of fre-
quencies when  < v < 2t   34c + : Otherwise the monopolist reaches the optimal frequency
levels.
3.6.4 Proof of Proposition 7
Optimality
We compare the welfare obtained under each network and nd the largest. Remind that the
welfare levels for each network once g = 0 are,
SW so =
8<: SW p = 3cv
2
2ct 1 if v < t  12c
SW f = 3v   3t2 + 34c if v > t  12c
dSW so =
8>>><>>>:
dSW p = 2ct(v )2+4ctv2 2t(4ct 3)  < v  t  34c + 4ctdSW d = 2c(v )2+t(8cv+3) 4ct2 24ct 1 t  34c + 4ct < v  t  34c + dSW f = 3v     3t2 + 98c v > t  34c + 
To be consistent we only make comparisons for v > ; which is the assumption made in the
star network case; also from that scenario we have that parameter  is assumed to belong to the
interval [0; t(4ct 3)4ct 1 ]: We also introduce some notation in the above expressions to simplify the
presentation of the proof with superscripts fp; d; fg for p partial coverage of markets, d partial
coverage of only the indirect ight market and f for full coverage of any market. The rst task
to do is to obtain a full ranking for the thesholds in the SW expressions. Thus, two di¤erent
cases are distinguished depending on the value of  :
Case i) if 0 <  < 14c <
t(4ct 3)
4ct 1 ; then  < t  34c + 4ct < t  34c +  < t  12c ; meaning that
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the disutility due to indirect ights is low and that there exists a range of v such that the star
network fully covers all markets while the complete network does not.
Case ii) if 0 < 14c <  <
t(4ct 3)
4ct 1 ; then  < t  34c + 4ct < t  12c < t  34c + ; meaning now
the opposite that there exists a range of v such that the complete network is fully covering the
markets while the star network is not.
CASE i) 0 <  < 14c :
-i.a) Take v > t  12c ; then both networks fully cover the markets and we compare SW f todSW f nding that the star network is the one implying larger welfare since dSW f   SW f > 0
i¤  < 38c which is the case.
-i.b) Take now t   34c +  < v < t   12c ; then the correct comparison is SW p with dSW f :
Note that dSW f   SW p is a quadratic and concave function in v with roots r  = t   12c  p
6(2ct 1)(3 8c)
12c ; r
+ = t  12c +
p
6(2ct 1)(3 8c)
12c (we are going to use in the sequel the notation
r  for the smallest root and r+ for the largest). Direct inspection of the roots leads to the
conclusion that when  > 38c the complete network is the one with greatest welfare level.
However for  < 14c the roots are real and we check that r
  < t   34c +  for all  2 [0; 14c ]
and similarly r+ > t   12c : Therefore, the star network is the one with greatest welfare if
t  34c +  < v < t  12c and 0 <  < 14c :
-i.c) Consider now t  34c+ 4ct < v < t  34c+: Note that the di¤erence dSW d SW p is a quad-











6c ]; meaning that for  in that interval the complete network implies









than t(4ct 3)4ct 1 when ct > 1 which is the case: Then for case i) the star network provides higher
welfare if v 2 [r ; r+]: And we prove that r  < t  34c + 4ct and also that t  34c +  < r+; thus
concluding that the star network yields higher welfare than the complete network.
-i.d) Finally take  < v < 2t   34c + 8ct ; the di¤erence dSW p   SW p is a quadratic convex
function in v with roots, r+;  = (2ct 13ct )((2ct 
p
ct(4ct  3)): Therefore, the star network
is welfare improving when v =2 [r ; r+]: Further note that r  < , then we conclude that for
 < v < r+ the complete network provides higher welfare whereas for r+ < v < t  34c + 4ct it
is the star network. Now we are ready to compare r+ with t  34c + 4ct in order to nd whether
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+ < t   34c + 4ct ; noting that 14c < 3t(4ct 3)(4ct 3)(4ct+1)+4pct(4ct 3) <
t(4ct 3)
4ct 1 : Summarizing, for all 0 <  <
1
4c ; if  < v < r
+ then the complete network is the one
that attains highest welfare, while for all r+ < v < t  34c + 4ct it is the star one.
CASE ii) 14c <  <
t(4ct 3)
4ct 1 :
-ii.a) Take v > t  34c +; then both networks fully cover the markets and we compare SW f
to dSW f and as in case i) the star network is the one implying higher welfare i¤  < 38c .
-ii.b) Take now t   12c < v < t   34c + ; then the correct comparison is SW f with dSW d:
Note that dSW f   SW d is a quadratic and convex function in v with roots r  = t +    34c  p
(4ct 1)( 3+8c)
4c ; r
+ = t +    34c +
p
6(2ct 1)( 3+8c)
4c . Direct inspection of the roots leads to
the conclusion that when  < 38c the star network is the one with largest welfare level. Besides
note that r+ > t   34c + ; and r  < t   12c : Therefore the complete network is the one with
higher welfare if  > 38c and for all v 2 [t  12c ; t  34c + ]:
-ii.c) Consider now t   34c + 4ct < v < t   12c : As in case i), dSW d   SW p is a quadratic























6c : Thus there are two possibilities:








6c <  <
t(4ct 3)
4ct 1 where the complete network is the one that attains higher
welfare for all v 2 [t  34c + 4ct ; t  12c ]:
ii.d) Finally for  < v < t   34c + 4ct ; the di¤erence to be analysed is dSW f   SW p as






4ct 1 ; then we
have two possible situations. Firstly, when  < 3t(4ct 3)
(4ct 3)(4ct+1)+4(2ct 1)
p
ct(4ct 3) ; we conclude
that for  < v < (2ct 13ct )(2ct +
p
ct(4ct  3)) it is the complete network the one that attains
higher welfare, while for all (2ct 13ct )(2ct+
p




ct(4ct 3) <  <
t(4ct 3)
4ct 1 ; it happens that t  34c+ 4ct < r+ and
therefore the complete network is the one that attains higher welfare for all v 2 [; t  34c + 4ct ].
The su¢ cient condition.
The sucient condition for the complete network to be socially preferred than the star comes
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6c the complete network is preferred
for a social planner for all v.
3.6.5 Proof of Proposition 8
Protability
We now compare the monopolist prots obtained under each network and nd the largest.
Remind that the equilibrium prots for each network once g = 0 are given by
 =
8<: p = 3cv
2
4ct 1 if v < 2t  12c





2t(8ct 3)  < v < 2t  34c + 8ct
^d = 2(v   t) + (v )24t + (v +4t)
2
4t(8ct 1) 2t  34c + 8ct < v < 2t  34c + 
^f = 3(v   t)  + 98c v > 2t  34c + 
As occurs in the previous proposition, two di¤erent cases are distinguished depending on
the value of  :
Case i) if 0 <  < 14c <
t(4ct 3)
4ct 1 ; then  < 2t  34c + 8ct < 2t  34c +  < 2t  12c :
Case ii) if 0 < 14c <  <
t(4ct 3)
4ct 1 ; then  < 2t  34c + 8ct < 2t  12c < 2t  34c + .
This similarity will allow us to follow the same logic as in the proof for optimality.
CASE i) 0 <  < 14c :
-i.a) Take v > 2t   12c ; then both networks fully cover the markets and we compare f to
^f nding that the star network is the one implying higher prots since ^f  f > 0 i¤  < 38c
which is the case.
-i.b) Take now 2t   34c +  < v < 2t   12c ; then the correct comparison is p with ^f :
The di¤erence ^f   p is a quadratic and concave function in v with roots r  = 2t   12c  p
6(4ct 1)(3 8c)
12c ; r
+ = 2t   12c +
p
6(4ct 1)(3 8c)
12c : When  >
3
8c the complete network is the
most protitable one, while for  < 14c the roots are real and we prove that r
  < 2t   34c + 
and r+ > 2t   12c :for all  2 [0; 14c ] Therefore, the star network is the most protable one if
2t  34c +  < v < 2t  12c and 0 <  < 14c :
-i.c) Consider now 2t   34c + 8ct < v < 2t   34c + : Now the appropriate comparison is













6c ]; meaning that for  in that interval the









6c is greater than
t(4ct 3)
4ct 1 when ct > 1
which is the case: Then, for case i), that is  < 14c ; the star network delivers higher prots
if v 2 [r ; r+]: And we prove that r  < 2t   34c + 8ct and also that 2t   34c +  < r+; thus
concluding that the star network is more protable than the complete network.
-i.d) Finally take  < v < 2t  34c+ 8ct ; the di¤erence ^p p is a quadratic convex function
in v with roots, r+;  = (4ct 16ct )((4ct 
p
2ct(8ct  3)): Therefore, the star network is more
protable when v =2 [r ; r+]: Further note that r  < , then we conclude that for  < v < r+ the
complete network is more protable while for r+ < v < 2t  34c+ 8ct ; it is the star network. Now
we are ready to compare r+ with 2t  34c+ 8ct in order to nd whether there are values of v in  <
v < 2t  34c+ 8ct that also satisfy v < r+:We nd that for all  < 6t(8ct 3)(8ct 3)(8ct+1)+4(4ct 1)p2ct(8ct 3) ;
r+ < 2t   34c + 8ct ; noting that 14c < 6t(8ct 3)(8ct 3)(8ct+1)+4(4ct 1)p2ct(8ct 3) <
t(4ct 3)
4ct 1 : Summarizing,
for all 0 <  < 14c ; if  < v < r
+ the complete network is the most protable one, while for all
r+ < v < 2t  34c + 8ct it is the star network.
CASE ii) 14c <  <
t(4ct 3)
4ct 1 : The ranking that applies is  < 2t   34c + 8ct < 2t   12c <
2t  34c + .
-ii.a) For v > 2t  34c +; both networks fully cover the markets and the prots comparison
yields that the star network is more protable i¤  < 38c .
-ii.b) When 2t   12c < v < 2t   34c + ; the correct comparison is f with ^d: Noting that




r+ = 2t+   34c +
p
(8ct 1)( 3+8c)
4c . Direct inspection of the roots leads to the conclusion that
when  < 38c the star network is the one with higher prots. Besides note that r
+ > 2t  34c +;
and also r  < 2t   12c when  > 38c : Therefore the complete network is the one with higher
prots if  > 38c and for all v 2 [2t  12c ; 2t  34c + ]:
-ii.c) Consider now 2t   34c + 8ct < v < 2t   12c : As in case i), ^d   p is a quadratic























6c : Two possibilities arise: either a)
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6c <  <
t(4ct 3)
4ct 1 where the complete network is the with higher prots
for all v 2 [2t  34c + 8ct ; 2t  12c ]:







4ct 1 ; then there are two possible situations.
Firstly, when  < 6t(8ct 3)
(8ct 3)(8ct+1)+4(4ct 1)
p
2ct(8ct 3) ; we conclude that for  < v < (
4ct 1
6ct )((4ctp
2ct(8ct  3)) it is the complete network the one preferred by the monopolist, while for
all (4ct 16ct )((4ct 
p




2ct(8ct 3) <  <
t(4ct 3)
4ct 1 ; it happens that 2t  34c + 8ct < r+ and therefore
the complete network is the one that attains higher prots for all v 2 [; t  34c + 4ct ].
The sucient condition for the complete network to be more protable than the star comes




6c the complete network is preferred
for the monopolist for all v.














2(4cIcEt cI cE) ; for the social optimum case.
c) nIi =
2cEt 1




4cIcEt cI 2cE for the mixed equillibrium.
It is also important to remind that, t must be big enough in order to satisfy that all
equilibrium frequncy levels are positive and the second order conditions. The specic condition




g; which imply two di¤erent situations: case a) if cI < 2cE ; where t > 1
cI
;
and case b) if cI > 2cE ; where t > 1
2cE















4cIcEt cI 2cE : The rst inequality holds for t >
1
4cE
and the second for t > 1
2cE
which
is always the case.

















2(4cIcEt cI cE) ; or equivalently whether the expression 2c(2ct   1)(9ct   1) is positive. Since
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so < nEi :
Next, note that nIi < n
I
i if and only if c(9ct   1) > 0 which always holds. Finally,
(nIi )
so < nIi is alreary proven above since in case of symmetry (n
I
i )
 = (nEi )
 and (nIi )
so =
(nEi )
so. Therefore (nIi )
so < nIi < n
I
i :
iii) In this item we prove that (nIi )
so < nIi and (n
E
ij)





First note that (nIi )
so < nIi if c
E + cI + 2((cE)2   3cEcI   9(cI)2)t+ 36cE(2cI   cE)t2 > 0:
case a) cI < 2cE ; where t > 1
cI
:
We focus on the subcase c
E
2 < c
I < 2cE that implies that the coe¢ cient of t2 is positive
and therefore the quadratic form is convex, which means that it is positive for all t outside the
interval formed by the roots of the polynomial.






And it can be easily proven that 1
cI
> r+ if 0:546153cE < cI < 2cE ; so we conclude that
(nIi )
so < nIi , for that interval.
Finally, (nEij)
so < nEij if c
E + cI   2(9(cE)2 + 3cEcI   (cI)2)t + 36cE(2cE   cI)t2 > 0: The
coe¢ cient of t2 is positive for the interval c
E
2 < c
I < 2cE ; so the quadratic polynomial is convex.
It is easy to nd that 1
cI
> r+ if c
E
2 < c




it happens that both (nIi )
so < nIi and (n
E
ij)




Behavioural Intentions: a passenger
airline model of decision making
about service quality
4.1 Introduction
The delivery of high service quality is a key strategy for rm success and survival in todays
competitive framework. In this regard, the service quality required by customers needs to be
determined to then develop the adequate strategies and meet their expectations (Parasuraman
et al., 1985). The intensity of competition in the airline sector has increased especially since the
emergence of low-cost carriers; this forces traditional carriers to reconsider their di¤erentiation
strategies thus questioning their positioning in the market. Di¤erentiation in service quality
reveals as one of the alternatives to the cost leadership strategy followed by such cheap ight
suppliers, given that the monopolistic position enjoyed by ag carriers is coming to an end
after the deregulation processes both in the USA and in Europe. Morash and Ozmet (1994)
claim that service quality conditions inuence rmscompetitive advantage, retaining customer
loyalty which leads to larger market share and, in the end, protability. Also, Buzzel and Gale
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(1987) assert that, normally, rms o¤ering a better service quality achieve a higher market
share growth.
Therefore, the motivation for the analysis in this chapter stems from the necessity of airlines
to have deeper knowledge on how service quality o¤ered to their passengers has an impact on
their behavioral intentions. The deeper the knowledge about the importance and satisfaction
of certain attributes, as well as their e¤ect on recommendation and repurchase, the higher the
suitability of resource allocation within the rm, and a sounder optimization of investment costs
can be achieved in the book-keeping of an airline.
The chapter is structured as follows. Section 4.2 describes the concepts around service
quality. Then section 4.3 examines di¤erent research models to set up the model developed
in section 4.4. The empirical analysis is given in section 4.5, and results are presented and
discussed in section 4.6. The chapter also provides conclusions (section 4.7), its weaknesses and
future directions of research (section 4.8) as well as managerial implications (section 4.9).
4.2 Concepts around service quality
The early modern concept of quality refers to Total Quality Management (TQM), a Japanese
philosophy originally from the manufacturing sector in the sense of producing zero defects,
making things right from scratch (Parasuraman et al.,1985). Crosby (1979) denes quality as
the "conformance to requirements of the product. However, the product-based concept of
quality is not appropriate to evaluate service quality, mainly because of characteristics such as
its intangibility, short-living nature, inseparability and heterogeneity of the services industry.
The rst concept that can be related with service quality is the customers expectation.
There exist multiple cases in the literature on satisfaction about expectations interpreted as
predictions on future events. At the same time, the literature on service quality associates
expectations to operationally referring to standard norms and rules (Forbes et al., 1986; Tse and
Wilton, 1988; Nicosia and Wilton,1986; Parasuraman et al., 1991). What is beyond question
is that airlines need understand passenger expectations to deliver an improved service (Askoy
et al., 2003). Also, the judgements about service quality and customer satisfaction involve
comparisons between a customers previous expectation and the return of the service delivered
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(Bagozzi, 1980, and Cronin and Taylor, 1992).
Secondly, the perception of the service and its interplay with expectations,gives rise to the
concept of perceived service quality. In the model of Parasuraman et al. (1985), the globally
perceived service quality for the consumer results from the comparison between perceptions and
expectations on the di¤erent components of service quality. Boulding et al. (1993) assume that
current perceptions are a blend of the prior expectations of what will and what should happen
during the contact, and the service actually delivered during the service encounter.
Thirdly we nd the concept of satisfaction intimately linked with perceived quality. In such
a link Boulding et al. (1993) connect satisfaction with consumer perceptions in a particular
transaction, whereas perceived service quality emphasizes the accumulation of that service
perceptions. Hunt (1977) denes satisfaction as the evaluation of an emotion. Rust and Oliver
(1994) suggest that satisfaction reects the degree to which the consumer believes that the
possession and/or use of a service evokes positive feelings.
Fourthly, the concept of service value appears as one more link between satisfaction and
perception, to a point that Hallowell (1996) says that satisfaction is the outcome of a customers
perception over perceived value. Zeithaml (1988) evaluates the exchanges in service and denes
value as the global evaluation of a product based on the perceptions about what is received and
what is given. The concept of service value is also associated with whatever is given up. Hart
et al. (1990) and Zeithaml (1988) present it as that which is foregone to acquire a particular
service, a multidimensional construct. The items representing consumer perceptions about
monetary and non-monetary prices associated with the purchase of a product or a service are
employed as constructs for that sacrice.
And fthly, as a consequence of providing service quality, we may talk about customers
behavioural intentions. To increase customer loyalty and/or diminish the ratio of customer drop-
outs stand as two of the most important capacities to generate prot. Zeithaml et al. (1996)
suggest that favourable behavioural intentions are connected with the ability of a service supplier
to make customers (1) tell positive things about the supplier, (2) stay loyal, (3) recommend the
supplier to others, (4) spend more on the rm and (5) pay premium prices.
There certainly exists further literature on the concepts of service quality and models de-
veloped from their interaction. In spite of this, from a managerial perspective simplicity and
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clear focus on their decision models are greatly required; this is particularly so when pressed for
time. The analysis that follows has these features; it is simple, useful and e¢ cient to directly
focus on the concepts of i) satisfaction with service quality (as per its attributes) and ii) pas-
senger behavioural intentions regarding repurchase and recommendation. The model applied
to the case-study is based on these premises; expectations, perceived quality and service value
are left out for future research.
4.3 Models that measure service quality
A number of papers exist on the measurement of service quality. Some focus on the antecedent-
mediator-consequent approach. Bagozzi (1992) suggests that the initial assessment of a service
produces an emotional reaction leading later behaviour. Boulding et al. (1993) dene three
processes to articulate their conceptualization: (1) the process by which customers form and
update their expectations, (2) the process by which customers develop perceptions of the quality
of specic and global aspects of the service delivery system and (3) the relationship between
perceptions of overall service quality and intended behaviours.
Every managerial strategy has, among its main objectives, to secure the viability of the rm
through its protability. Di¤erentiation through service quality is no di¤erent from any other
strategy since the lack of prot over time leads to shut-down. The relationship between service
quality and protability is neither a simple nor a direct one; this is why the intermediate stages
need to be studied, as in the example of service quality and behavioural intentions (Zahorik
and Rust, 1992). These authors distinguish ve tasks to model the impact of service quality
on prot: (1) identify the key attributes in a service to be included in the model, (2) select
the most important attributes, (3) model the link between service programmes and customers
attitudes towards them, (4) model the behavioral response to such programmes and (5) model
the impact of these programmes on prot.
Research on satisfaction, value and perceived quality, as in Hallowell (1996), treats customer
satisfaction as the result of customer perception about the delivered value. Also Fornell et al.
(1996) conclude that the main determinant aspect regarding global satisfaction is perceived
quality followed by perceived value. Athanasspopoulos (2000) shows that customer satisfaction
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is highly correlated with value and a variety of quality attributes, the price among them. Rust
and Oliver (1994) conclude that favourable perceptions of service quality carry improvements
in attributes related with value and satisfaction.
Focusing on the relationship between satisfaction and behavioural intentions, numerous
papers nd evidence on their positive relation such as with recommendation and repurchase.
For example, Reichheld (1996) determines that more satised customers are six times more
likely to repurchase Xerox products than less satised ones. Cronin and Taylor (1992) nd
a positive correlation between service quality and behavioural intentions. Woodside et al.
(1989) provide evidence on a signicant association between patientsglobal satisfaction and
the purpose of choosing the same hospital again. Berry et al. (1988a) and Zeithaml et al. (1996)
investigate whether a positive and signicant relation exists between perceived service quality
and customerspropensity to recommend purchase as well as their intentions to purchase again.
The lack of consensus on the constructs of perceived value reinforces the research question
posed in this chapter and earlier advanced. We shall center on the relation between customer
satisfaction and behavioural intentions. Therefore, the model of decision making will be as
simple as possible to highlight the importance of certain quality attributes to further study their
impact on customersfuture intentions regarding repurchase and recommendation of service.
4.4 Case-study: conceptual framework
As already noted, the concepts around service quality are wide and varied within the service
cycle. In addition, the variety of existing models would lead a manager, who takes decisions
under incomplete information and pressed by time, to pick the simplest model o¤ering quick
answers with a high probability of success. If the information available were complete then the
manager would not be needed at all. If time were not a constraint then more elaborate models
could be developed with higher probability of making successful decisions. Unfortunately this
is not the case of the air transport sector, where the dynamics of competition are constantly
compelling managers to take swift decisions always with a lack of information. For these
reasons we wish to set up a model in terms of its usability for the actual management of an
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airline company.
Figure 4.1: Conceptual Framework
The model is thus based on an information system and analysis about customer satisfaction
in service quality attributes, and on customersbehavioural intentions about recommendation
and repurchase. The goal is to integrate such information system as an input for strategic
decision making, above all in terms of investment and resource allocation.
As can be seen in its graphical representation, service quality is composed of a series of n
attributes. The variables that are measured for every attribute are their relative importance as
well as their satisfaction level. The behavioural intentions considered are customer repurchase
and recommendation. The information conveyed by the model is of three types: how important
is every attribute to a passenger, which is the passengers satisfaction level per attribute, and
nally whether he/she would repurchase and/or recommend ying with the airline in ques-
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tion. The interaction among these types of information allows us to establish the hypotheses
to be tested as to the relationship between importance and satisfaction on an attribute and
repurchase/recommendation of service.
In the rst part, we obtain information about passenger importance and satisfaction regard-
ing the number of attributes in which service quality has been divided for the model analyzed.
This information permits the construction of a positioning matrix by measuring the level of
importance in the vertical axis and level of satisfaction in the horizontal axis. This provides a
rst snapshot within which decisions are taken, with regard to the priorities of passengers.
Then, two hypotheses are specied. They refer to which attributes and by how much do
they increase passenger behavioural intentions about repurchase and recommendation. The
hypotheses to be veried are the following:
 Hypothesis H1: The level of satisfaction of every attribute of service quality inuences
the probability of repurchase of the service.
 Hypothesis H2: The level of satisfaction of every attribute of service quality inuences
the probability of recommendation of the service.
4.5 Measurement tool: passenger surveys
The survey was carried out in 2006 through a total of 3.000 questionnaires circulated to passen-
gers in three European airports. The percentage of valid responses was 72% totalling a number
of 2.162 questionnaires completed. The questionnaire was designed as follows:
- The attributes of service quality were determined by means of a focalized work group of
ve passengers with an annual ight frequency greater than or equal to six (ensuring a minimum
of one ight every two months). The attributes were chosen on the basis of the Servqual model
on measurement of service quality (Parasaruman et al. 1988). Their disposition and nal
choice was made so as to have them as customized as possible with the necessities and actual
expectations of actual air transport passengers. The nal list included:
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Food & beverages on board
Table 4.1: Attributes of Service Quality
- How satised is a passenger with every attribute was measured by a Likert scale, from 1 to
4, as an increasing degree of satisfaction. The main reason for choosing an even number is
the practical criterion of their usefulness for manager decision taking. An even scale forces the
pollee not to stay in the middle and to opt for a positive or a negative opinion about satisfaction,
which is indeed the information he/she reveals when taking a decision.
- To measure the relative importance of attributes for passengers, the method chosen was to
ask them to rank just the most relevant attributes. To this end the questionnaire asked about
the three most important attributes and passengers were told to rank them with 3 points to
the most important one, 2 points to the next in importance, and 1 point to the third more
important.
- Two measures have been used to evaluate passenger behavioural intentions, repurchase
and recommendation, in a yes/no scale.




18 to 24 5,5%
25 to 35 34,0%







less than 6 times a year 58,6%
6 to 12 times 21,1%
13 to 24 times 10,8%
over 25 times 9,5%
Table 4.2: Passenger Proles
4.6 Empirical results analysis
This section presents the empirical analysis outlined in earlier sections. Firstly, the analysis
considers the matrix of importance and how it can be used by managers. Secondly, the results
for testing hypotheses H1 and H2 are given.
4.6.1 Descriptive analysis of relative importance of attributes: their inu-
ence in the management of service quality satisfaction
The relative importance of every attribute and its average level of satisfaction are shown below
in Table 4.3.
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Crew attention 8,9% 3,74
Comfort 6,1% 3,09







Table 4.3: Relative Importance and Average Satisfaction
The results reveal that higher levels of customer satisfaction can be achieved with actions
on those attributes with greater relative importance and with greater potential growth. Thus,
decisions targeted to punctuality, fares, timetable/frequency, crew attention and comfort should
be given priority by managers. Also the Table shows that there is further scope for improvement
in fares, timetable/frequency and comfort rather than in crew attention, where passengers are
very satised. Strategic investment decisions in actions to improve satisfaction should therefore
consider matrices similar to the above one. More precise information regarding this type of
actions is given next with the quantitative analysis of the variables involved. This together
with a report on the viability of the investment (economic, physical, etc...) will help in further
focusing on adequate resource allocation.
4.6.2 Testing hypotheses H1-H2: The level of satisfaction of an attribute
inuences the probability of repurchase/recommendation
We now have a dichotomic dependent variable (yes/no) for the repurchase and recommendation
decision which is a function of a change in a number of attributes of service quality, these are
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qualitative explanatory variables (from 1 to 2, from 2 to 3, from 3 to 4). The model is thus
estimated with a logit regression analysis, where the independent variables are ordered. In
addition, marginal e¤ects are taken into account in the estimation. The initial regression has
been carried out with 12 explanatory attributes. Table 4.4 below shows the results. The
following comments are in order.
- 4 attributes out of 12 are found signicant: an increase of a one-point level of satisfaction
translates to an increase in the probability of repurchase and recommendation. These attributes
are punctuality, fares, cabin comfort and food/beverages. The attribute with a greater impact
on the increase in such probability is cabin comfort, 25,94% and 27,96% for repurchase and re-
commendation, respectively. It is followed by food/beverages (19,33% and 19,81%, respectively,
although the former is signicant at 90%).
- Besides, timetable/frequency and check-in are signicant at the 90% level only regarding
recommendation, their probabilities of increase being 8,51% and 18,41%, respectively.
- Of the 4 statistically signicant attributes, cabin comfort stands as the one that supposes
the highest increase in the probability of repurchase, followed by food/beverages, fares and
punctuality. Regarding the probability of reccommendation, punctuality comes before fares.
Besides, "timetable/ frequency" is signicant in recommendation and is 3rd in importance.
Crew attention, though important (it ranks 4th); does not appear as signicant for the in-
crease in probability of repurchase and recommendation. Additionally, food/beverages, despite
it ranking 10th in relative importance terms, does lead to a considerable increase in the prob-
ability of repurchase and recommendation. This nding reinforces the initial exploration of the
information contained in the matrix importance/satisfaction in the sense that the relevance of
attributes must be taken into account when taking decisions.
- Of the 4 statistically signicant attributes, cabin comfort is shown the attribute which
substantially increases the probability of repurchase, followed by food/beverages, fares and
punctuality. The latter two attributes exchange their order regarding the probability of recom-
mendation.
- The increase in the probabiilty of repurchase is greater than in that of recommendation
for punctuality, when increasing by one the level of satisfaction. For fares and cabin comfort
the opposite holds.
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- Regarding passenger type (business vs others), the estimates show that this variable is
non-signicant.
Table 4.4: Ordered Logit Regression
To test for the robustness of our results several estimations have been carried out, beginning
with considering the ve most important attributes. Out of these estimates, three statistically
signicant attibutes were selected, and then attributes have been added two by two until com-
pleting the analysis. The robustness results are shown in Table 4.5 in the Appendix; they
conrm the results presented in the main text. Table 4.5 in the appendix is constructed by
taking groups of ve attributes ordered by relative importance. There, it can be seen that
the range of increases in the probability of repurchase/recommendation is 23,9%-34,7% for
comfort; 10,1-22,0% for punctuality, and 8,1%-16,3% for fares.This happens for all groupings.
The attribute food/beveradges is found signicant only as to repurchase - see test 5 of Table 4.5.
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4.7 Conclusions
The strong and dynamic competition brought about by the emergence of low-cost carriers in the
airline sector has pushed their boards of managers to set a higher pace and good judgement in
their strategic decisions at all levels. The strategy of di¤erentiation through service quality is a
possible alternative to the strategy of cost leadership. The knowledge of passenger satisfaction
about service quality o¤ered by an airline, as well as how it impacts on passenger behavioural
intentions, are very relevant for the investments and resource allocation that managers have to
undertake in an agile way.
The model proposed in the case study is aimed at making managerial decisions easier re-
garding an airlines positioning of service quality. Such model is based on an information system
centered on how passengers dene the attributes of service quality, how important is every at-
tribute, and how the level of satisfaction in every attribute is perceived with service experience.
The information system is integrated in the model of decision taking by rst building a ranking
of importance and satisfaction level to learn the priorities of taking actions per attribute  
regarding the relative importance of every attribute and also the potential to improve its level
of satisfaction. Secondly, the ordered logit regression analysis permits a quantitative assessment
regarding how increasing the level of satisfaction in an attribute a¤ects behavioural intentions
on repurchase and recommendation.
The hypotheses tested conrm that the relative importance and level of satisfaction of at-
tributes prioritizes those on which to take decisions. In the sample, the ve out of twelve most
important attributes (punctuality, fares, timetable/frequency, crew attention and cabin com-
fort) show di¤erent levels of satisfaction, being punctuality, fares and cabin comfort the ones
on which decisions on investment and resource allocation should be targeted as these also have
a greater potential for improvement. The ndings derived from the regression analysis show
that only four out of twelve attributes are statistically signicant to increase the probability
of repurchase/recommendation by increasing their level of satisfaction. These are punctuality,
fares, cabin comfort and food/beverages, where cabin comfort is found to have the stronger
impact, followed by food/beveradge, fares and punctuality - for the probability of repurchase.
Two more attributes are signicant just regarding the probability of recommendation - check-in
and food/beverages. Passenger type is found non-signicant neither for repurchase nor recom-
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mendation. However, business passenger type adds two attributes that increase the probability
of recommendation: boarding and languages. Therefore, the model developed, and supported
by a case study, lends itself as a simple and useful information system for strategic decision
making regarding service quality in airline management.
4.8 Deciencies and future research
From the viewpoint of marketing and market research, where the models proposed are exhaust-
ive and detailed, the current model is prone to improvement, although its guidance for quick
decisions in investment/resource allocation directly based on customer information leaves any
renements of the model for future analysis. Also the development of current research on service
value and its relationships with satisfaction and behavioural intentions manifest the inclusion
of the latter dimension in the model.
4.9 Managerial implications
The complexity, dinamism and strong competition in the passenger airline sector put strong
pressure on managers, who have to take decisions with lack of information and with time con-
straints. The decisions on investment and optimal resource allocation must be, at all strategic
levels, targeted at prot and loss statements and based on customer decisions. The simple
model proposed and its operative results reveals useful information as to strategic decisions
regarding service quality.
It reinforces managers in their application and improvement of airline performance; it also
enhances customer target. With these, managers will enjoy a more precise knowledge of market
segmentation in the decisions per attribute of service quality, not only as to an ordering of
importance but also as to the potential for improvement in satisfaction and, consequently, as
to their impact on repurchase and recommendation intentions. This will certainly complement
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